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ABSTRACT
In this study, I examine the influence of construals (interpretations) and mindsets
on professional skepticism in auditors. Auditors have been criticized lately for not
displaying enough professional skepticism, particularly in their audits of complex
estimates (PCAOB 2008). Regulators speculate about and academic research shows a
correlation between low professional skepticism and both audit failures and audit
malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002). I hypothesize that
prolonging the deliberative mindset in the audit judgment and decision-making process
can increase professional skepticism in auditors.
Experienced auditors take part in a 1 x 3 between-participants experiment in
which they play the role of a senior auditor charged with evaluating a client’s fair value
estimate. I manipulate the type of mindset (deliberative or implemental) invoked by the
evidence documentation instructions and have a third condition in which participants do
not have to document audit evidence. Using multiple measures of professional
skepticism, I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition display higher
professional skepticism than both auditors in the implemental mindset condition and
auditors in the no documentation condition. I further analyze the types of textual
responses entered by the auditors and offer direction for future research in this area.

v

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Questions and Motivation
The purpose of this study is to explore whether and how different mindsets
influence professional skepticism. Professional skepticism, an attitude characterized by
objectivity and a questioning mind, is a central tenet in the auditing standards (AU 230).
Recently auditors have been criticized for not displaying enough professional skepticism,
particularly in their audits of complex estimates (PCAOB 2008; Bratten et al. 2013).
Prior studies correlate a lack of professional skepticism with both audit failures and audit
malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002).
Gollwitzer (1990) and Gollwitzer and Bayer (1999), based on earlier work by
Heckhausen (1986), describe two mindsets individuals enter before taking actions: the
deliberative mindset and the implemental mindset. Individuals in a deliberative mindset
are deciding whether to take an action while individuals in an implemental mindset are
thought to be planning an action (Freitas et al. 2004). Figure 1 displays Heckhausen’s
(1986) original model. Prior research in psychology associates the deliberative mindset
with objectivity and high-level (abstract) interpretations of evidence or alternatives
(Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer et al. 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999). Studies in
psychology show that objectivity becomes greatly diminished when an individual enters
the implemental mindset, as the individual becomes decided on a given action
(Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer et al. 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999; Freitas et al. 2004).
1

I address two research questions in this study. First, how do the deliberative and
implemental mindsets affect an auditor’s professional skepticism? Second, what effect
will an intervention designed to prolong the deliberative mindset have on professional
skepticism? Currently there is little empirical evidence that being in a deliberative
mindset will have an effect on judgments and actions that would be indicative of
professional skepticism. 1
Once decided upon an action, an individual focuses on evidence or alternatives
that favor the chosen action (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2002). Prior accounting
research documents an analog to this effect that occurs when auditors have directional
goals of pleasing their clients. Several studies note that auditors have a tendency to side
with their clients, and this tendency leads to a biased search for and processing of audit
evidence (Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1998; Kadous et al. 2003;
Montague 2010). The auditor behavior observed in these studies is consistent with the
notion that auditors could be prone to moving directly into an implemental mindset, an
act consistent with Gollwitzer’s (1990) suggestion that the deliberative mindset can be
bypassed.
Since professional skepticism could be reduced, if not eliminated, upon entry into
the implemental mindset, keeping an auditor within the deliberative mindset for as long
as possible could increase professional skepticism. Theoretically, auditors kept in a
deliberative mindset will stay objective longer, which should increase their professional
1

One possible exception is Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) which shows that individuals in a deliberative
mindset are more likely to attend to risk factors than are individuals in an implemental mindset. The study
does not, however, explore how individuals act on those risk factors or how their judgments could be
affected by those risk factors.
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skepticism and help combat biases such as the tendency to side with the client described
above. For example, in an audit of a complex estimate, an auditor who maintains a
deliberative mindset longer should have a more objective search for and processing of
audit evidence than one who moves into an implemental mindset early in the audit
process. Further, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in a deliberative
mindset are more likely to attend to risk factors than are individuals in an implemental
mindset. This finding suggests that auditors who move into an implemental mindset
early could have trouble assessing audit risks.
Prior research using construal level theory offers suggestions on how the
deliberative mindset can be maintained. Construal level theory espouses the idea of
psychological distance, the general feeling of how close (or far) an individual believes
himself to be from something (Trope and Liberman 2010). 2 A deliberative mindset
generally relates to high psychological distance (akin to objectivity in this context) while
an implemental mindset has been associated with low psychological distance (Fujita et al.
2006; Fujita et al. 2007; Rim et al. 2009).
Trope and Liberman (2003; 2010) suggest that increased psychological distance
can be achieved by processing information with high-level construals (interpretations).
High-level construals are abstract, simple, and structured. For example, a high-level
construal of the act of conducting a research study is that the researcher is “advancing
science” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405). In contrast, low-level construals are detailed,
complex, and unstructured. A low-level construal of the act of conducting a research
Note that “distance” in this theory relates not only to physical distance but also to other concepts such as
temporal distance (how soon something will happen) and social distance (how close an individual feels to
another emotionally) (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010).
2
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study is that the researcher is “testing a hypothesis,” or “entering the data collected this
morning” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405).3 Prior accounting research demonstrates that
processing information with high-level construals can help an auditor curb a client’s
aggressive reporting behavior (Backof et al. 2011).
Considering audit evidence with high-level construals should enable an auditor to
increase the psychological distance between himself and the audit evidence. High-level
construals can increase psychological distance because they allow an individual to view
information in a more abstract form which increases objective processing of both positive
and negative information (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007). The
increased psychological distance should allow the auditor to remain in a deliberative
mindset longer which will help maintain the auditor’s objectivity, thus promoting
professional skepticism.
Considering audit evidence with low-level construals, however, could lead to
directional, biased processing of the evidence, potentially inhibiting professional
skepticism. Low-level construals focus on specific, detailed aspects of information
making it harder for individuals to consider alternatives to that information (Trope and
Liberman 2003; Fujita et al. 2007). Processing information with low-level construals
would be detrimental to the audit process because such processing could enable the
auditor to work towards a specific goal such as the goal of pleasing the client or
confirming the client’s position rather than remain objective (Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer
and Bayer 1999; Freitas et al. 2004).
3

In an auditing context, an example of a high-level construal of auditing would be that auditors are
providing assurance. An example of a low-level construal of auditing would be any of the specific
procedures conducted during the course of the audit.
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Prior psychology research describes mechanisms that can move individuals into
an implemental mindset or otherwise decrease psychological distance. One of these
mechanisms consists of having an individual generate specific examples from things like
a category of objects or an intended plan of action (Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995; Fujita et
al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009). An analog of this mechanism in audit practice is the
documentation requirement. In the context of the audit of a complex estimate, auditors
will document the specific reasons why they either confirmed the client’s estimate or why
they recommended an adjustment of the estimate.
If an auditor begins the documentation process early then the process could move
the auditor into an implemental mindset before he has fully considered all of the available
audit evidence. An implemental mindset does not foster objective processing of evidence
and could exacerbate the problem of auditors tending to side with their clients to the
extent that the remaining audit evidence is accumulated and processed with directional
goals (such as pleasing the client) in mind (Gollwitzer 1990; Lundgren and Prislin 1998;
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1998; Kadous et al. 2003; Montague 2010). Further,
individuals in an implemental mindset have more trouble evaluating risk factors than do
individuals in a deliberative mindset (Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995). Thus, the audit
documentation process, in its current form, could be inhibiting both professional
skepticism and an auditor’s ability to make effective risk assessments.
I hypothesize that auditors in an implemental mindset will display lower levels of
professional skepticism than will auditors in either a deliberative mindset or auditors that
are not placed into a specific mindset. A finding that auditors in an implemental mindset
display less professional skepticism than auditors not placed into a specific mindset will
5

serve as evidence that the documentation requirement potentially inhibits professional
skepticism. I further hypothesize that auditors kept in a deliberative mindset will display
the highest levels of professional skepticism.
1.2 Research Design
To test these hypotheses, I use an experiment designed to help illuminate the
relation between psychological distance, mindsets and professional skepticism. I use a 1
x 3 between-participants design with the following three conditions: deliberative mindset
condition, implemental mindset condition, and no documentation condition. My
participants are auditors with experience auditing complex estimates.
The participants take part in a simulated audit of a complex estimate, namely a
fair value estimate. Each participant receives background information on the client and
the task and receives several pieces of evidence pertinent to the audit. Although the
evidence items include positive (supporting the client’s estimate), neutral, and negative
(disconfirming the client’s estimate) evidence, I balance the evidence such that the ratio
is 1:2:2 of positive, neutral, and negative evidence items, respectively. The negative
evidence collectively suggests that the client’s estimate is at the upper end of a reasonable
range of the estimate. This setting is one that should call for increased professional
skepticism.
I ask participants in the deliberative mindset condition to broadly consider the
evidence and write down a broad summary of the evidence. Consistent with prior
research, broad consideration of the evidence should help the participants to maintain a
deliberative mindset and increase the psychological distance between the participants and
6

the evidence (Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011). I ask participants in
the implemental mindset condition to consider and write down specific reasons why the
client’s estimate is either fairly stated or misstated. This act should serve to push the
participants into an implemental mindset and decrease the psychological distance
between the participants and the evidence (Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et
al. 2011). I design the implemental mindset condition to mimic the audit practice of
documenting specific reasons why an auditor chooses a particular action. Participants in
the no documentation condition are not required to document evidence and therefore
receive no instructions.
In theory and as codified in the accounting standards, auditors should be objective
throughout the audit process. If objectivity is associated with the deliberative mindset
then auditors should begin with a deliberative mindset and stay in that mindset for as long
as possible. However, given the biases displayed by auditors described above coupled
with the idea that the deliberative mindset can be bypassed (Gollwitzer 1990), I cannot be
certain in which mindset participants will begin. With respect to the Heckhausen (1986)
shown in Figure 1, I expect the experimental interventions to have poignantly different
effects on an auditor’s mindset. As shown in Figure 2, the instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset should theoretically increase the time an auditor remains in
a deliberative mindset while the instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset
should increase the time an auditor is in an implemental mindset (at the cost of time in
the deliberative mindset).4

4

I am grateful to Billy Brink for suggesting this figure.

7

I next ask the participants whether they wish to continue searching for additional
evidence relative to the fair value audit. I consider additional searching to be consistent
with increased professional skepticism. Participants that elect to continue searching
receive new pieces of evidence that again suggest that the client’s estimate is at the upper
bound of a reasonable range for the fair value estimate. Upon viewing the new evidence,
the participants are again subjected to their experimental manipulations and can decide to
continue searching for new evidence.
After the participants decide they have viewed enough evidence, they are asked a
series of questions regarding the task. The questions include an assessment of the risk of
a material misstatement in the client’s estimate and an indication of the likelihood of
whether or not the participant would recommend an adjustment to the estimate. An
increase in professional skepticism would be demonstrated by a) an increased level of
searching for audit evidence; b) an increased assessment of risk; and/or c) an increase in
the likelihood of recommending an audit adjustment.
The post-experimental questionnaire (PEQ) captures other important variables
and possible covariates. The PEQ includes the 30-question Hurtt (2010) professional
skepticism scale that is designed to capture trait professional skepticism. 5 I also include a
test derived from Fujita et al. (2006) that helps detect whether the participant is thinking
in terms of high-level construals or low-level construals which will serve as evidence of
the success or failure of the experimental manipulations.

5

Hurtt (2010) describes two types of professional skepticism: state and trait. Trait professional skepticism
is a person’s innate skeptical nature that remains constant over time. State professional skepticism can vary
with each unique situation.
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The focus of the analysis is on the level of professional skepticism displayed by
participants in the deliberative mindset condition compared with the level displayed by
participants in the other two conditions. I predict that a higher level of professional
skepticism will be displayed by the deliberative mindset participants. Independent coders
are used to help establish whether the participants’ responses are indicative of high-level
or low-level construals. I use the pattern displayed by the coding to see if I can determine
when the shift to the implemental mindset occurs.6
Further, I contrast the level of professional skepticism displayed by participants in
the implemental mindset condition with the level displayed by participants in the no
documentation condition. I hypothesize that participants in the implemental mindset
condition will display a lower level of professional skepticism. Such a result would
potentially indicate that the current practice of documenting evidence inhibits
professional skepticism. This finding combined with a finding that participants in the
deliberative mindset condition displayed the highest level of professional skepticism
would suggest that the current practice of documentation could be altered slightly to
improve professional skepticism.
1.3 Results and Contribution
Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find that auditors given instructions
designed to invoke a deliberative mindset display higher professional skepticism than do
auditors given instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset and auditors not
6

As discussed in the fourth section, responses indicative of high-level construals are coded as +1 while
responses indicative of low-level construals are coded as -1. I theorize that a shift in the pattern from
responses coded positive to responses coded negative marks the shift from the deliberative mindset to the
implemental mindset. Unfortunately, I did not have enough data to report on this proposition. Please see
section 4.7 for further details.
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receiving documentation instructions. Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition
spent more time searching for and reviewing audit evidence, spent more time on the
study, assessed higher risks that management’s estimate contains a material misstatement,
and indicated a higher likelihood that they would recommend an adjustment of
management’s estimate than did auditors in the implemental mindset and no
documentation conditions. Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition also conducted
more searches for evidence than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition, but
not more than participants in the no documentation condition. These results contribute to
psychology and auditing theory by establishing a relation between psychological
distance, mindsets, and professional skepticism.
My results can be useful for academics, regulators and practitioners in several
different ways. First, I show that auditors should consider evidence with broad
interpretations of the evidence rather than consider specific examples of audit evidence as
required under the current auditing standards (PCAOB 2004). Second, my results can be
useful to those seeking to create a judgment model that can aid auditors in their
evaluations of complex client estimates (SEC 2008).
Third, I answer a call for research by Bratten et al. (2013) to examine task specific
factors that can affect an auditor’s ability to filter management bias in judgments related
to complex estimates. I show that instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset
and consider the “why” of the situation can assist an auditor in breaking through
management bias and preferences to side with the client’s estimate. My results suggest
that auditors in a deliberative mindset condition will be more likely to consider audit
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evidence collectively and better impound the negative information which some auditors
fail to see (Griffith et al. 2012).
Additionally, I provide evidence supporting the problems discussed by Bratten et
al. (2013) and Christensen et al. (2012) relating to the difficulty of the task of auditing
complex estimates. Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition rated the experimental
task as being significantly more difficult than auditors in the implemental mindset and no
documentation conditions. I document a possible consequence of this difference in the
finding that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition did not conduct more searches
for evidence than auditors in the no documentation group despite showing higher
professional skepticism through the other measures.
I suggest that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition might have ended
their search for evidence prior to the maximum number of searches allowed because of
the increase in perceived complexity. Auditors in the no documentation condition,
despite being apparently less skeptical, could have continued their search for evidence
simply because it was less cognitively taxing for them to do so since they did not have to
document evidence. Future research can examine this conjecture that task complexity
and professional skepticism are negatively related.
Fourth, this study continues the exploration of “state,” or situational, professional
skepticism called for by Hurtt (2010). By linking professional skepticism with mindsets,
I show that an auditor’s state professional skepticism can be heightened by prolonging
the deliberative mindset. The auditors participating in my study do not significantly
differ in their levels of trait, or permanent, professional skepticism; thus, according to
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Hurtt (2010), the differences in professional skepticism displayed by my auditor
participants must be due to differences in their state professional skepticism. My results
provide evidence that state professional skepticism can be altered through task-specific
factors. The results also suggest that the deliberative mindset intervention can be useful
in freeing auditors from the bias towards siding with their client (Hackenbrack and
Nelson 1996; Peecher 1996; Haynes et al. 1998; Kadous et al. 2003) since it helps
auditors maintain a more objective mindset when evaluating audit evidence.
Interestingly, I fail to show that auditors given instructions designed to invoke an
implemental mindset display lower professional skepticism than do auditors not receiving
documentation instructions. A possible reason for this lack of a finding is that auditors
are currently required to consider and document evidence with specific, detailed
responses (PCAOB 2004). Thus, even though auditors in the no documentation condition
did not have to document evidence, they still considered the evidence as they would in a
normal audit situation in which they would be required to document evidence. This
result highlights the importance of changing the manner in which auditors consider and
document audit evidence.
Finally, I find strong support for my third set of hypotheses that predicts a relation
between the types of responses entered as audit documentation and auditor mindset.
Auditors in the deliberative mindset condition entered broad, abstract responses a greater
percentage of the time than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition. By
extension, auditors in the implemental mindset condition entered specific, detailed
responses a greater percentage of the time. This finding helps to solidify the relation
between mindsets, psychological distance, and professional skepticism.
12

In terms of contribution, the results for Hypothesis 3 help open up the black box
of professional skepticism. From these results we can potentially derive an ex post
measure of professional skepticism that can be used to chart an auditor’s level of
professional skepticism at given points during an audit. For example, audit
documentation can be examined to see what types of responses are entered during various
stages of the audit, which can help reviewers and regulators establish whether the auditor
was in a mindset conducive to professional skepticism during those stages. Future
research will be useful in adapting the results of this paper into this potential measure and
can be used to test the efficacy of the measure.

Deliberate
taking action
(Deliberative
Mindset)

Plan action
implementation
(Implemental
Mindset)

Take action

Figure 1 – Heckhausen’s (1986) Self-Regulation Phases
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Take Action
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Implemental
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Deliberative Mindset

Take Action

Implemental Mindset Condition

Deliberative
Mindset

Implemental
Mindset

Take Action

Figure 2 – Theoretical Effects of Documentation Instructions
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Professional Skepticism
Skepticism “is a manifestation of objectivity, holding no special concern for
preconceived conclusions on any side of an issue” (Louwers et al. 2011, 16). According
to the auditing standards, professional skepticism “is an attitude that includes a
questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence” (AU 230.07). The standard
further describes that “the auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor
assumes unquestioned honesty. In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor should
not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is
honest” (AU 230.09).
Academics are not uniform in their interpretation of professional skepticism.
Nelson (2009) recently reviewed the literature on professional skepticism and found that
researchers interpret professional skepticism in at least two different ways. Some
maintain that the standards promote a “neutral” perspective of skepticism. For example,
Hurtt (2010, 151) defines professional skepticism as “a multi-dimensional construct that
characterizes the propensity of an individual to defer concluding until the evidence
provides sufficient support for one alternative/explanation over others.”
Other researchers promote a “presumptive doubt” interpretation of professional
skepticism. For example, Shaub (1996) promotes the idea that skepticism is the opposite

15

of trust, or suspicion. Both Bell et al. (2005) and Nelson (2009) believe that relatively
recent additions to the auditing standards, including SAS No. 57 (AU 342, Auditing
Accounting Estimates) and SAS No. 99 (AU 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit), promote a “presumptive doubt” interpretation of professional
skepticism because these standards reference fraud and management bias.
Regulators also appear to have adopted the “presumptive doubt” perspective. The
SEC, and more specifically the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
lists a lack of professional skepticism as a significant contributor to audit failures
(Beasley et al. 2001; PCAOB 2008). The PCAOB recently summarized its observations
gathered from inspection reports issued during the period 2004 through 2007. In this
report the PCAOB notes “…in many cases, inadequate supervision and review and
failures to apply appropriate professional skepticism were important factors that allowed
deficiencies to occur” (PCAOB 2008, 20). Also of note, Anderson and Wolfe (2002) list
a failure to maintain professional skepticism as a contributor to audit malpractice claims.
Nelson’s (2009) model of the determinants of professional skepticism in audit
performance shows that evidential inputs affect skeptical judgments. Skeptical
judgments in turn affect skeptical actions, with both judgments and actions affected by an
auditor’s incentives, traits, knowledge, experience, and training. Skeptical action affects
an auditor’s perception and interpretation of the accumulated audit evidence. The model
is recursive in that the evidential outcome affects an auditor’s experience, which in turn
affects evidential inputs.

16

Hurtt (2010) suggests that there are two forms of professional skepticism: trait
skepticism and state skepticism. Trait professional skepticism is a person’s innate
skeptical nature that is constant over time. State professional skepticism is situational
and can be increased or decreased depending on an individual’s perception of the
situation. Both trait and state skepticism are important in forming an auditor’s skeptical
mindset, and this mindset leads to skeptical behavior. Certain moderating variables, such
as engagement circumstances and client integrity, can affect both state skepticism and
skeptical behavior. Hurtt (2010) created a scale to measure trait professional skepticism,
but at the current time no scale exists to measure state professional skepticism. Hurtt
comments: “Our understanding of professional skepticism will remain incomplete…until
we begin to address the issues of state professional skepticism and skeptical behaviors”
(2010, 165).
2.2 Mindset Theory
Mindset theory, as described in Gollwitzer (1990), illuminates the interaction
between cognitive and motivational processes that takes place when individuals make
decisions and take action. Of interest to the current study are the two mindsets entered
into by individuals prior to making a decision: the deliberative mindset and the
implemental mindset. These two preactional mindsets are important to the concept of
professional skepticism because they affect how individuals process and interpret
information (Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer and Bayer 1999).
The first mindset individuals typically enter when making decisions is the
deliberative mindset (Gollwitzer 1990). The deliberative mindset can be characterized by
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impartiality and objectivity. While in the deliberative mindset, individuals remain
receptive to information from all sources regardless of the content of that information
(positive or negative) (Fujita et al. 2007). Psychology studies show that individuals in a
deliberative mindset (relative to an implemental mindset) have increased memory
retention and an increased ability to process information (Heckhausen and Gollwitzer
1987; Fujita et al. 2007).
Individuals will eventually enter an implemental mindset as they become closer to
making a decision or taking an action. While in the implemental mindset, individuals
choose a preferred goal or option and focus on information that will allow them to
implement that goal (Gollwitzer 1990). In contrast with the deliberative mindset, the
implemental mindset can be characterized by partiality and biased information processing
(Fujita et al. 2007). Prior studies reveal that individuals in the implemental mindset
become motivated to finish the task at hand more quickly and place greater value on
information that supports a chosen goal (Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989; Harmon-Jones and
Harmon-Jones 2002). In fact, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in the
implemental mindset consider information that favors a preferred outcome five time more
frequently than they consider information that disfavors the preferred outcome.
Given that the concepts of professional skepticism and objectivity are strongly
linked (Louwers et al. 2011), I propose that professional skepticism would be strongest in
the deliberative mindset and would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, in the
implemental mindset. This proposition is central to the current study because Gollwitzer
(1990) claims that individuals can bypass the deliberative mindset and move right into
the implemental mindset under certain circumstances. Backof et al. (2011) suggest that
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one of these circumstances is when a preexisting bias or motivation exists such as an
auditor’s tendency to side with their client.
For example, Haynes et al. (1998) note that even experienced auditors have a
tendency to follow their client’s preferences with regards to inventory write-downs.
When auditors have directional goals of pleasing their clients, their search for and
processing of evidence can become biased as greater consideration is placed on evidence
that favors the client’s position (Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Hackenbrack and Nelson
1998; Kadous et al. 2003; Montague 2010). This effect on the search and processing of
audit evidence is consistent with the effects noted above of being in an implemental
mindset.
The tendency to side with a client’s known position could be stronger in a
complex estimate setting. For example, consider the audit (evaluation) of a fair value
estimate. At times fair value can be easily determined by direct observations of market
transactions of identical or similar items. Other times, however, the fair value can only
be determined with valuation models that require inputs based on assumptions about the
future (AICPA 2003). Regarding this latter type of estimation, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) writes, “Those estimates of fair value are
inherently imprecise. That is because, among other things, the estimates may be based on
assumptions about future conditions, transactions, or events whose outcome is uncertain
and will therefore be subject to change over time” (AICPA 2003, 2). I presume that the
tendency to side with the client would be stronger in this situation because it is harder to
challenge assumptions than it is to challenge concrete facts, and prior research shows that
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auditors will react more favorably to clients when ambiguity exists (for examples, see
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Ng and Tan 2003).
Backof et al. (2011) describe the entry into the implemental mindset as the “point
of no return” to objectivity. Thus, mechanisms that can prolong the deliberative mindset
would be of interest to accounting researchers, practitioners, and regulators because the
deliberative mindset can potentially help maintain an auditor’s objectivity as he or she
searches for and reviews evidence during the audit of a complex estimate. Construallevel theory ties into mindset theory and illustrates mechanisms that can be used to
prolong the deliberative mindset.
2.3 Construal-Level Theory
Construal-level theory (CLT) offers guidance on how individuals perceive the
feasibility and desirability of a situation occurring in the near future versus the same
situation occurring in the distant future. Although CLT initially focused on temporal
distance and perceptions, the theory has broadened over the years to include other
dimensions of distance collectively referred to as psychological distance (Trope and
Liberman 2003). Psychological distance “is a subjective experience that something is
close or far away from the self, here, and now” (Trope and Liberman 2010, 440). With
this broader dimension, researchers now use CLT to describe how individuals make
predictions and evaluate situations, how gambling preferences are affected, and how
construals can affect interpersonal negotiation (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010).
A construal, by definition, is an interpretation. There are two types of construals
identified by CLT: low-level construals and high-level construals. According to Trope
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and Liberman (2003), low-level construals can be described as complex and detailed
whereas high-level construals can be described as simple and abstract. Low-level
construals focus on the “how” of a situation while high-level construals focus on the
“why” of a situation. Low-level construals decrease the psychological distance between
an individual and what he or she is interpreting (Trope and Liberman 2010).
Trope and Liberman (2003) provide an illustration of the difference between the
two levels of construals. Consider the act of conducting a research study. A low-level
construal of this act is that the researcher is “testing a hypothesis,” or “entering the data
collected this morning” (p. 405). In an auditing context, a low-level construal of the act
of auditing a client’s financial statements would be a listing of any of the specific
procedures performed during the audit such as interviewing the client, confirming
accounts receivable, or documenting evidence. The low-level construals are more
detailed, transactional interpretations of the act and focus on how to accomplish the act
(Trope and Liberman 2003; Fujita et al. 2007).
A high-level construal of the act of conducting a research study is that the
researcher is “advancing science” (Trope and Liberman 2003, 405). In an auditing
context, a high-level construal of the act of auditing is that the auditors are providing
assurance to financial statement users. Viewing the act through high-level construals
makes representations of the event more abstract. This abstraction allows for easier
assimilation of information because the representations become less ambiguous, more
coherent, and more schematic (Trope and Liberman 2010). High-level construals focus
on why the act is occurring or will occur and increase the psychological distance between
an individual and the act (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007).
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Prior research links the concepts of construals and psychological distance with
mindset theory. Specifically, the deliberative mindset is associated with high-level
construals and increased psychological distance while the implemental mindset is
associated with low-level construals and decreased psychological distance (Fujita et al.
2006; Fujita et al. 2007; Rim et al. 2009). Given that the deliberative mindset is
characterized by impartiality and objectivity and that increased psychological distance is
associated with the deliberative mindset, an extension of CLT theory is that increased
psychological distance should be associated with increased objectivity. Correspondingly,
a decrease in psychological distance should be associated with a decrease in objectivity
given the link between the implemental mindset (a mindset characterized by the biased
processing of information), low-level construals, and decreased psychological distance
(Fujita et al. 2007; Backof et al. 2011).
Backof et al. (2011) recently applied construal level theory to an auditing setting.
The authors posit that thinking about an accounting treatment using high-level construals
will allow auditors to consider the economic substance of the proposed accounting
treatment rather than getting mired in the specific details of the treatment. They provide
evidence that judgment frameworks based on construal-level theory can be effective in
curbing an auditor’s propensity to accept a client’s aggressive accounting choice when
the accounting standards are less precise.
The Backof et al. (2011) study shows how construal-level theory helps to curb a
client’s aggressive accounting choices but what remains unclear is how the theory affects
professional skepticism. Generalization of the results to professional skepticism is
difficult for two reasons. First, participants in the Backof et al. (2011) study provided
22

judgments based on a set of facts rather than on a set of assumptions as would be required
in the audit of a complex estimate. In a GAAP setting, the set of facts should lead to a
relatively clear auditor response that would not require the use of professional
skepticism. 7
A related second reason is that an important part of professional skepticism is “the
gathering and objective evaluation of evidence” (AU 320.07). The search for audit
evidence is omitted in the Backof et al. (2011) study. Objective evaluation of the set of
facts provided by management in the study is not possible in their study because the
participants had no method to corroborate or disconfirm the facts provided.
The current study contributes to the literature beyond the Backof et al. (2011)
study by employing a setting that is more broadly applicable to professional skepticism,
because it contains both an evidence search and evaluation process and requires
judgments based on a set of assumptions rather than a set of facts. I also contribute to the
literature by adding tests at the end of the experiment designed to show that participants
considered the audit evidence with either high-level or low-level construals which will
help express whether the participants’ mindsets worked as hypothesized. 8
Prior psychology research demonstrates techniques used to create psychological
distance. One of these techniques is to have individuals consider a set of objects.

7

For example, Backof et al. (2011) use a lease classification case. Under GAAP, the facts provided clearly
indicate that the lease should be treated as an operating lease. Typically, no professional skepticism would
be called for or used in this scenario. However, the authors note that the participants’ professional
skepticism (presumably their state professional skepticism) may have been affected because the lease terms
appeared to be structured by the client to meet the operating lease classification. Their wording of the facts
could have affected professional skepticism unintentionally. In most lease classification settings the use of
professional skepticism would not be necessary.
8
Backof et al. (2011) did not contain such tests nor did they provide sufficient detail for readers to
determine whether their judgment frameworks worked because of a shift in construals/mindsets.
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Researchers instruct participants to consider specific examples of items within the set in
order to decrease psychological distance. Increased psychological distance is attained by
having the participants think more broadly and categorically about the set of objects
(Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995; Fujita et al. 2006; Rim et al. 2009).
Given the link between psychological distance and mindsets theorized above,
manipulations that lead to increased psychological distance should help an individual
maintain a deliberative mindset longer. Manipulations that decrease psychological
distance could push an individual into an implemental mindset. Conversations with both
current and previous auditors reveal that auditors document specific examples of
evidence as they work towards completing an audit, a process that could be pushing
auditors into an implemental mindset early in the audit process.
2.4 Audit Documentation
The auditing standards require significant documentation over the course of the
audit including documentation of “the procedures performed, evidence obtained, and
conclusions reached with respect to relevant financial statement assertions” (PCAOB
2004, section 6). Practitioners and researchers often refer to Auditing Standard No. 3 as
the “not documented, not done” standard (Piercey 2011). Audit documentation can start
early in the course of an audit.
The current audit documentation process is comparable to manipulations used in
prior research (as described above) to place participants into an implemental mindset.
Thus, the process could be inadvertently placing auditors into an implemental mindset
early in the audit which would be detrimental to the auditor’s professional skepticism.
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Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in an implemental mindset perceive
risk factors as being less likely to affect them than do individuals in a deliberative
mindset. A similar finding in an audit context could be detrimental to the audit risk
assessment process if risk factors are improperly weighed by auditors in an implemental
mindset (i.e., the risk factors are ignored when they are, in fact, important to consider
given the situation).
Piercey (2011) reveals another unintended consequence of the current audit
documentation process. He shows that qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) risk
assessments made as part of the audit documentation requirement can lead to audit
conclusions more likely to favor the client. The documentation process could be
exacerbating the auditor tendency to side with the client described earlier to the extent
that auditors use their documentation to rationalize their decisions.
Payne and Ramsay (2008) reveal that preparing detailed workpapers to satisfy the
documentation requirements has both positive and negative effects. On one hand the
preparation of detailed workpapers improves error identification and pattern recognition.
On the other hand, detailed workpapers require more time to prepare. The preparation of
summary documentation memos (akin to high-level construals of the audit evidence) also
leads to enhanced pattern recognition and increased memory, both of which should
increase the rate and efficiency of information/evidence processing. This result is
consistent with processing evidence with a deliberative mindset (Heckhausen and
Gollwitzer 1987; Fujita et al. 2007).
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In sum, detailed documentation of audit evidence as required under Auditing
Standard No. 3 could have the unintended consequence of placing auditors in an
implemental mindset. The implemental mindset is associated with biased processing of
information which would be detrimental to professional skepticism and the audit process
as a whole. This study will test whether a method of documentation consistent with the
concepts of high-level construals, increased psychological distance, and the deliberative
mindset can help increase professional skepticism.

26

3.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Hypothesis 1
Professional skepticism is marked by objectivity (Louwers et al. 2011).
Professional skepticism can exist in the deliberative mindset because individuals in this
mindset have not chosen a goal and process information impartially and objectively
(Fujita et al. 2007). However, professional skepticism could be diminished, if not
eliminated, in the implemental mindset as objectivity is eliminated and individuals focus
on information that favors their chosen goal.
The previous section identifies two forces that can work against professional
skepticism: the audit documentation process and the tendency for auditors to side with
their clients. The current audit documentation process can work against professional
skepticism because auditors document specific examples of evidence that support their
overall audit recommendation. This type of documentation focuses on how the audited
item is either fairly presented or materially misstated. Both considering specific
examples and focusing on the how of a situation (low-level construals) are mechanisms
used in prior psychology studies to decrease psychological distance (for examples, see
Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995, Fujita et al. 2006, and Rim et al. 2009). Low-level
construals and decreased psychological distance theoretically relate to the implemental
mindset.
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I posit that a change in the way auditors complete audit documentation could be
effective in prolonging the deliberative mindset which should theoretically increase
professional skepticism. The change will involve a switch from considering and
documenting evidence in terms of low-level construals to considering and documenting
evidence in terms of high-level construals. High-level construals help increase
psychological distance, and both high-level construals and increased psychological
distance theoretically relate to the deliberative mindset.
This strategy could prove ineffective, however, if an auditor’s tendency to side
with his or her client moves the auditor straight into the implemental mindset. Gollwitzer
(1990) suggests that the deliberative mindset can be skipped. Auditors going into an
audit of a complex estimate with the directional goal of siding with the client could
already have their objectivity compromised and be in an implemental mindset before the
audit starts (Backof et al. 2011). In this case, the question becomes whether the revision
to the audit documentation process suggested in this paper can move an auditor back into
a deliberative mindset or whether entry into the implemental mindset truly marks the
“point of no return” to objectivity suggested by Backof et al. (2011).
Thinking in terms of high-level construals involves considering the why of a
situation rather than the how (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010). Further, thinking
broadly and categorically about a situation rather than considering specific examples also
marks thinking with high-level construals (Fujita et al. 2006; Trope and Liberman 2010).
Thus, I predict that having auditors consider broad reasons why a complex estimate is
either fairly presented or potentially misstated will help auditors remain in a deliberative
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mindset longer, or push them back into a deliberative mindset from an implemental
mindset, thus increasing the auditors’ objectivity and professional skepticism.
H1a: Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional
skepticism than will auditors receiving documentation instructions
designed to invoke an implemental mindset.
H1b: Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional
skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence.
3.2 Hypothesis 2
To help gain further insight into which forces inhibit professional skepticism the
most, I plan to contrast the professional skepticism displayed by auditors instructed to
consider and document evidence in terms of low-level construals (akin to current audit
practice) and auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions. There are three
potential outcomes, all of which I interpret here under the assumption that H1 holds. The
first potential outcome is that auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions
display lower professional skepticism than will auditors required to consider and
document evidence with low-level construals. This outcome would provide some
evidence that the current audit documentation process actually helps counteract the
auditor tendency to side with the client.
The second potential outcome is that there is not a significant difference in
professional skepticism displayed between auditors considering and documenting
evidence with low-level construals and auditors not receiving explicit documentation
instructions. In this case there would be stronger evidence that the tendency to side with
the client pushes an auditor into an implemental mindset early. The audit documentation
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process would not cause further inhibition to professional skepticism because the move to
the implemental process had already been completed.
The third potential outcome is that auditors required to consider and document the
audit evidence with low-level construals will display lower professional skepticism than
will auditors not receiving explicit documentation instructions. In this case the audit
documentation process could be exacerbating any loss in professional skepticism related
to the auditor tendency to side with the client. Alternatively, the audit documentation
process could be driving the move to the implemental mindset if auditors’ commitment to
accuracy is greater than their commitment to pleasing the client. 9 I consider this last
potential outcome the most likely given Piercey’s (2011) finding that qualitative audit
documentation can exacerbate the auditor tendency to side with the client.
H2: Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to
invoke an implemental mindset will display lower professional
skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence.

3.3 Hypothesis 3
One way the shift between mindsets can be monitored is to examine when
documentation changes from being broad and abstract (associated with a
deliberative mindset) to specific and detailed (associated with an implemental
mindset). The instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset instruct the
user to think in terms of high-level construals. High-level construals are

Backof et al. (2011) provide some evidence that an auditor’s commitment to accuracy is greater than his
or her commitment to pleasing the client, but at least part of the difference is attributable to the standards
regime in use. The commitment to accuracy appears to be much less under a GAAP regime than an IFRS
regime.
9

30

characterized as being broad and abstract. Low-level construals, conversely, are
characterized as being specific and detailed (Trope and Liberman 2003). The
major difference between the two types of responses is that a specific, detailed
response would mainly appear as a direct copy of an evidence item and would not
consider the relation of that evidence item with other evidence. A broad, abstract
response, on the other hand, would consider an evidence item in general terms
and would likely consider that item’s relation to other evidence collected. I
predict that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative
mindset will spend more time documenting evidence in a manner consistent with
high-level construals (i.e., broad and abstract).
Mindset theory suggests that individuals will inevitably enter the
implemental mindset as they become closer to making a decision or taking an
action (Gollwitzer 1990). Thus, at some point, even individuals receiving
instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will shift mindsets,
although there is no ex ante evidence of how and when this shift will occur.
Regardless, I expect the experimental intervention to prolong the deliberative
mindset and thus would expect a significantly higher ratio of broad, abstract
responses to specific, detailed responses among participants in the deliberative
mindset condition.
H3a: Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset will have a higher ratio of broad,
abstract responses to specific, detailed responses than will auditors
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an
implemental mindset.
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H3b: Auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to
invoke an implemental mindset will have a higher ratio of specific,
detailed responses to broad, abstract responses than will auditors
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke a
deliberative mindset.
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4.0 METHOD
4.1 Introduction
I employ an experiment to investigate whether specific mindsets can be invoked
in auditors and what effect the invoked mindset will have on professional skepticism. I
use a computerized experiment that has the experimental manipulations built into it. The
use of a computerized instrument allows me to easily investigate elements important to
the concept of professional skepticism such as the amount of time auditors spend in each
section of the experiment and how many evidence searches they conduct. Further, the
instrument captures textual responses from participants that, as will be discussed further,
can be coded to allow for insights into the type of mindset displayed by each auditor.
The unique design of the instrument is useful in determining when auditors shift mindsets
and what role mindsets play in the auditors’ decision-making processes.
4.2 Research Design
I use a 1 x 3 between-participants experimental design to test my hypotheses. The
participants are 58 auditors from local, regional, national, and international accounting
firms experienced in auditing complex estimates. The independent variable in this
experiment is the type of mindset induced. The first experimental condition attempts to
induce a deliberative mindset. The second experimental condition attempts to induce an
implemental mindset. The third condition is a condition in which the participants do not
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receive mindset/documentation instructions. The participants were randomly assigned to
one of these three conditions.
4.3 Treatments/Independent Variable
The independent variable in this experiment is the type of mindset induced. I
examine each of the two different preactional mindsets: the deliberative mindset and the
implemental mindset. The participants in the deliberative mindset condition saw the
following wording when considering audit evidence:
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why
management’s estimate could be fairly presented.
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why
management’s estimate could be materially misstated.
I draw the wording for this condition from prior construal-level theory literature
which shows that thinking broadly about a situation and why the situation occurred
involves using high-level construals which increases the psychological distance between
a person and the situation and helps maintain a deliberative mindset longer (Fujita et al.
2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011). The participants view these
instructions both before and after considering the audit evidence produced by each of
their searches.
The participants in the implemental mindset condition saw the following wording
when considering audit evidence:
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s
estimate could be fairly presented.
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s
estimate could be materially misstated.
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I draw the wording for this condition from prior construal-level theory literature
which shows that thinking about a situation with specific details of the “how” of a
situation involves using low-level construals which will decrease the psychological
distance between a person and a situation and will push the person into an implemental
mindset (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011). The participants
in the no documentation condition did not receive any instructions regarding the
evidence.
4.4 Dependent Variables
I capture five dependent variables that can be used to draw inferences about a
participant’s professional skepticism. The use of multiple measures of professional
skepticism should increase the robustness of the results. The first measure is a
participant’s assessment of the likelihood that the client’s estimate contains a material
misstatement. The second measure is a participant’s assessment of the likelihood that
they would recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate. Answers to both of these
questions are captured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 equating to a low
likelihood and 10 equating to a high likelihood. Higher likelihoods are representative of
higher professional skepticism (skeptical judgment) in this task. I derive both of these
questions from questions used in Montague (2010).
The remaining three dependent variables are captured via participants’ actions in
the study and are used as measures of skeptical action. The third dependent variable
captures the amount of time a participant spends in the search for and review of audit
evidence phase of the task. The fourth dependent variable captures the total time a
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participant spent on the study. The fifth dependent variable captures the number of
searches for additional audit evidence conducted by each participant. I hypothesize that a
greater number of searches is indicative of higher professional skepticism (skeptical
action).10
During the experiment, participants in the experimental conditions provide textual
responses relating to their documentation of the audit evidence. As indicated in section
4.3, these textual responses come from the audit documentation instructions that are
specific to the deliberative and implemental mindsets, respectively. During the final
judgments phase of the study, all participants provide textual responses to a question
asking them to support the reasons for their judgments. I use independent coders to code
each set of textual responses so that the responses can be analyzed and used to test
Hypothesis 3. I describe the coding method in Section 4.7.
4.5 Covariates
I ask the participants several questions on a post-experimental questionnaire. The
answers to these questions are examined as possible covariates. I begin by providing the
participants with the 30-question Hurtt (2010) professional skepticism scale. Hurtt
designed this scale to measure a participant’s trait, or permanent, professional skepticism.
Each of the questions is answered on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly
Disagree”) to 6 (“Strongly Agree”). The range of possible scores on this scale is 30 to
180 with higher numbers indicating a higher degree of trait professional skepticism. In

10

The idea that the number of evidence searches is a measure of skeptical action is consistent with the
description of skeptical action used in Hurtt et al. (2013). Support for the idea that the time variables can
be considered measures of skeptical action can be found in Section 5.4.
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other words, respondents with a high degree of trait professional skepticism are more
skeptical by nature regardless of the circumstances.
Participants also respond to a series of eight questions drawn from Fujita et al.
(2006) that allow me to measure each participant’s construal level. The participants are
asked to choose from one of two descriptions of an event. One of the descriptions is a
broad, abstract description consistent with a high-level construal of the event. The other
description is a detailed, specific description of the event. Consistent with Fujita et al.
(2006), I give participants a score of -1 for each detailed, specific response and +1 for
each broad, abstract response; thus, the range of possible responses is -8 to +8. Positive
total scores are indicative that the participant is in the deliberative mindset while negative
total scores suggest that the participant is in the implemental mindset.
I require participants to answer eleven questions about their thoughts and the
experimental task. I provide the scale used to measure the responses to these questions in
Figure 3. The first question asks the participants about the confidence they have in their
assessment of the client’s fair value estimate. Consistent with a limitation described in
Montague (2010), auditors lacking confidence in their assessments could be less likely to
recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate (thus potentially moderating responses
to the adjustment likelihood dependent variable).
Another question asks the extent to which the participants trust the information
provided by the client. Higher trust in the information could result in lower professional
skepticism displayed by the participants. I also ask about the perceived riskiness of the
client. A higher perceived client riskiness could lead to higher displays of professional
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skepticism. Additionally, participants respond with their perceptions of the importance
of the client. Auditors may be more likely to accept evidence and estimates provided by
a client with higher importance and thus would respond with lower professional
skepticism.
I ask seven questions that directly relate to perceptions of the audit task. The
answers to these questions can potentially provide further information about the
participants’ choices and actions. One of these questions asks the participants about their
perceived difficulty levels of the task. My interest here is to see whether the
experimental interventions increase (or decrease) the perceived difficulty of the task. I
also ask about the realism of the task to provide a measure of external validity.
The other five questions relate to the search for evidence portion of the
experiment. First, I ask participants whether they believed the amount of time allocated
by the audit manager to complete the task was reasonable. Second, I also ask whether the
participants felt comfortable taking as many audit hours as necessary to complete the
task. Third, I ask the participants whether they were motivated to finish the task in as
few audit hours as possible.
Fourth, I ask whether the participants were satisfied that they evidence they
collected provided them with a reasonable basis for forming their opinions. Finally, I
asked whether the participants would have spent more time on the audit if they had more
audit hours budgeted to the task. Each of these five questions can potentially provide
insights into the reasons why the participants concluded their searches for audit evidence.
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4.6 Task
I use a case adapted from Kohlbeck et al. (2009), as used in Montague (2010),
which involves an audit of a client’s intangible asset account (reacquired franchise
rights). I selected this case for several reasons. First, the case is based on an actual
transaction recorded by Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. Second, auditors commonly
perform evaluations of fair value estimates of this type, which helps increase the
generalizability of the results (Montague 2010). Third, the case involves a high amount
of ambiguity which allows for the creation of a setting in which auditors should be
skeptical.
Each participant began the experiment by reviewing background and financial
information about the client, American Pizza Company (APC). The information included
a description of the company and its franchising activities. A table presented information
about the client’s financial statements, including the value of its reacquired franchise
rights accounts. Participants also read information about the client’s accounting policies
related to reacquired franchise rights.
The next screen of information contained information relevant to the experimental
task. Each participant read that their firm has audited APC for over ten years and that the
client is a significant source of revenue for the firm. The participants considered specific
information about the reacquired franchise rights accounts and learned that the fair value
of the account was greater than the book value of the account. The current screen also
displayed management’s assumptions used in generating the fair value estimate. The
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participants had the opportunity to review this information as well as the client
information at any time prior to entering in their final judgments.
After reviewing the client and task information, the participants began their search
for evidence relating to the task. I created thirty pieces of evidence that related to the
client and/or the client’s reacquired franchise rights accounts. In order to create a
skeptical setting, I generated 12 evidence items which collectively suggested that the
client’s estimate was overstated. I also generated six evidence items which collectively
suggested that the client’s estimate was fairly stated and 12 neutral evidence items which
were largely irrelevant to the task. The incorporation of neutral evidence increases the
external validity of the task since auditors often uncover evidence neither directly
supports nor disconfirms the client’s position.
I gave the list of evidence to several current and former audit managers who
agreed that each item of evidence was appropriately labeled as either positive, negative or
neutral evidence. I also gave an unlabeled, alphabetized list to three audit managers who
rated the strength of each evidence item on a scale of -5 (Extremely negative) to +5
(Extremely positive), with 0 labeled as neutral. The average strength of the negative
evidence was -2.53 (s.d. = 1.73). The average strength of the positive evidence was 2.17
(s.d. = 1.82) while the average strength of the neutral evidence was -0.08 (s.d. = 1.44).
These ratings by the audit managers provide support for the claimed directionality of the
evidence as being either positive, negative, or neutral.
The first screen of evidence presented to participants contained 10 evidence
items: four negative items, four neutral items, and two positive items. Each successive
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screen of evidence contained five evidence items. I maintained the same ratio of 2:2:1
(negative:neutral:positive) in each screen of evidence.
In order to reinforce the fact that continued searches for audit evidence are not
costless, the computerized instrument displayed a time budget to all participants. The use
of a time budget in this task is consistent with Montague (2010) and with audit practice.
On the first screen of evidence, each participant learns that 70-percent of the current audit
budget has been expended to generate the initial round of evidence. After learning the
percent of audit hours used, each participant reads the following statement:
Your audit manager will look favorably upon you if you complete the fair value
audit using as few audit hours as possible; however, you should continue
searching for evidence until you have satisfied yourself that you have obtained
sufficient appropriate evidential matter to provide you with a reasonable basis for
forming an opinion.
Each successive search for evidence increments the percentage used by 10
percent. Each participant had the ability to continue searching up to four times.
Participants using all available searches go over the budget by 10 percent (i.e., they
would have used 110 percent of the audit hours allocated to the task by the audit
manager). After each search, participants in the deliberative and implemental mindset
conditions responded to the questions described in section 4.3.
Upon completion of their search, the participants reported 1) their perceived risk
that the estimate is materially misstated; 2) an indication of where in a reasonable range
the estimate would fall; and 3) their perceived likelihood that they would recommend an
adjustment to the client’s reacquired franchise rights account. Each participant also listed
reasons supported the answers provided. The participants then completed a post-
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experimental questionnaire that included manipulation checks, the Hurtt (2010)
professional skepticism scale, and demographic questions.
Figure 4 graphically displays the phases of the experiment.
4.7 Data Coding
The participants in the deliberative mindset and implemental mindset conditions
entered textual responses to the documentation questions described in section 4.3. The
majority of the responses consisted of more than one sentence. I transferred each unique
set of responses into a cell of a spreadsheet to keep the sentences together.
Two student assistants blind to my hypotheses served as independent coders. I
sorted the responses alphabetically before giving them to the coders. I instructed the
coders to consider each cell separately.
I told the coders that they needed to code each set of responses into one of two
possible alternatives. A set of responses should be coded as -1 if the sentences
collectively indicated that the respondent appeared to be thinking in specific, detailed
terms. Alternatively, a set of responses should be coded as +1 if the sentences
collectively indicated that the respondent appeared to be thinking in broad, abstract terms.
I gave the coders the following example to use in their coding. I asked them to
consider that a respondent saw the following items of evidence: 1) The fruit is red; 2) The
fruit is approximately six inches tall; and 3) The fruit has a stem on top. An example of
specific, detailed thinking would be if the respondent simply relisted the evidence
verbatim and did not draw any conclusions. On the other hand, and example of broad,
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abstract thinking would be if the respondent commented on the evidence but also wrote
something to the effect of “Considering the evidence collectively leads me to believe that
this fruit could be an apple.” In other words, the respondent assimilated the evidence and
drew a possible conclusion.
The coders returned their initial set of coding to me and I noted any differences
between the codes. Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that a “moderate” level of
agreement would be demonstrated with a Cohen’s Kappa coefficient between 0.41 and
0.60. The initial inter-rater agreement was low (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.304). As
a result, I performed a recalibration of the instructions with the coders.
I next gave the coders a random subset of 100 of the textual responses. The level
of agreement for the coding of these responses was much higher than the first attempt
(Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.616). According to Landis and Koch (1977), a Kappa
coefficient between 0.61 and 0.80 would be indicative of “substantial” agreement. I then
gave the coders a second subset of 100 items for which the level of agreement was
moderate (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.537). The coders had a high level of
agreement for the final subset of 93 responses (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.627). The
overall Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient for the full set of responses was 0.580. The coders
worked out all remaining differences, so the final version of the coding represents 100
percent agreement between the two coders.
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Variable Name
Independent Variable
Mindset Condition

Question/Definition
Deliberative mindset condition, Implemental mindset
condition, or No documentation condition

Dependent Variables
Given the evidence available in the case, assess the risk that
management’s fair value estimate of $24,620,000 for the
Assessment of
reacquired franchise rights in Pennsylvania is materially
Misstatement Risk
misstated. Likert Scale (1=”Very Unlikely”; 10=”Very
Likely”)
Given the evidence available in the case, what is the
Assessment of the
likelihood that you would recommend an adjustment to the
Likelihood of
client’s reported book value for the reacquired franchise
Recommending an
rights in Pennsylvania (Book Value = $22,770,000). Likert
Adjustment
Scale (1=”Very Unlikely”; 10=”Very Likely”)
Time Spent Searching For The number of minutes spent in the search for, review of,
and Reviewing Audit
and documentation of audit evidence phases of the
Evidence
experiment.
Total Time Spent on the The number of minutes from start of the experiment to the
Study
conclusion of the experiment
The number of times a participant conducts a search for
Number of Searches
audit evidence beyond the initial round of evidence given to
them.
Covariates
Measured using Hurtt’s (2010) professional skepticism scale
Hurtt (2010) Professional which captures participant trait professional skepticism.
Skepticism Score
Measure ranges from 30 – 180, with higher scores
representing higher inherent professional skepticism.
Measured using exercise found in Fujita et al. (2006) which
captures a participant’s construal level and mindset.
Measure ranges from -8 to +8, with lower scores
Construal Level
representing low-level construals (implemental mindset) and
higher scores representing high-level construals (deliberative
mindset).
How confident do you feel about your assessment of
Confidence in
management’s fair value estimate for reacquired franchise
Assessment
rights in Pennsylvania? Likert Scale (1=”Not Confident”;
10=”Very Confident”)
To what extent do you trust the information provided by
Trust Information
your client? Likert Scale (1=”Do not at all trust”;
Provided by Client
10=”Highly trust”)
Please provide your assessment of the riskiness of this client
Perceived Riskiness of
based solely on the information available to you in this case.
Client
Likert Scale (1=”Not Risky at All”; 10=”Very Risky”)
Client Importance
American Pizza Company is an important client for my firm.
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Task Difficulty
Reasonableness of Time
Allocated by Audit
Manager
Comfort Taking Time

Motivation to Finish Task
Satisfied that Evidence
Collected is Reasonable
to Form an Opinion
Would Have Spent More
Time if More Audit
Hours Budgeted

Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”)
How easy or difficult was this task for you to complete?
Likert Scale (1=”Very Difficult”; 10=”Very Easy”)
I felt that the time allocated by the audit manager to
complete this task was reasonable. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly
Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”)
I felt comfortable taking as many audit hours as necessary to
complete this task. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”;
10=”Strongly Agree”)
I was motivated to finish this task in as few audit hours as
possible. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly
Agree”)
I am satisfied that the evidence I collected in this task was
sufficient to have a reasonable basis for forming the opinions
that I expressed in this study. Likert Scale (1=”Strongly
Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”)
I would have spent more time on the audit if my audit
manager had budgeted more time for this task. Likert Scale
(1=”Strongly Disagree”; 10=”Strongly Agree”)

Figure 3 – Variable Definitions
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Yes

Client Info

Audit Info

Review Audit
Evidence

Document
Evidence
(Experimental
Conditions
Only)

Figure 4 – Phases of Experiment
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Continue
Search for
Evidence?

No
Final
Judgments

PEQ and
Demographics

5.0 RESULTS
5.1 Analysis of Participant Demographic Information and Responses
Fifty-eight experienced auditors from six local, regional, national, and
international public accounting firms participated in my study. Table 5.1 displays the
demographic information both between experimental conditions and combined. The
participants averaged 29.6 years of age with both gender types represented equally. The
participants reported an average of 8.3 years of general work experience and 5.4 years of
audit experience. Most of the participants reported being at the audit senior level (60.3
percent of the sample) and that they work for an international accounting firm (74.1
percent of the sample). Each participant completed the Hurtt professional skepticism
questionnaire which measures a person’s trait, or permanent, skepticism level.
Participants averaged a score of 129.71 based on their responses. Skepticism scores did
not significantly vary between experimental conditions (p-value of 0.204).
I required that participants have at least some experience auditing fair value
estimates in order to take part in this study. However, six participants (10.3-percent of
the sample) reported having no such experience. I checked for differences in the
responses of these six participants and found that the participants reporting no fair value
auditing experience reported a significantly lower number of evidence searches than
participants with fair value auditing experience (means of 1.0 and 2.31 searches,
respectively). The responses to the other dependent variables did not differ between
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groups. The results discussed in this chapter do not differ if these participants are
removed from the sample.
Each participant completed a post-experimental questionnaire that contained
several questions. All of the questions were answered on ten-point scales numbered from
one to 10. Table 5.2 provides information about participant responses to these questions.
Overall the participants expressed confidence in their assessments of the client’s fair
value estimate (𝑥̅ = 7.40 on a scale where 1 = “Not Confident” and 10 = “Very
Confident”). The participants agreed that the client is an important client to the firm (𝑥̅ =
8.95 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”). The
participants further agreed that the experimental task is a realistic example of an audit
task (𝑥̅ = 7.59 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”).
The participants disagreed about other aspects of the experimental task.
Participants in the deliberative mindset condition rated the task as significantly more
difficult (𝑥̅ = 5.95 on a scale where 1 = “Very Difficult” and 10 = “Very Easy) than did
participants in the implemental mindset condition (𝑥̅ = 7.21) and the no documentation
condition (𝑥̅ = 7.40), with a p-value for the difference of 0.049. A possible reason for
this difference is that participants in the deliberative mindset condition had to consider
the evidence collectively rather than singularly which could have been more cognitively
taxing.
The participants also disagreed about the appropriateness of the time allocated to
the task. I first asked participants whether they felt that the time allocated by the audit
manager to complete the task was reasonable. Participants in the deliberative mindset
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condition indicated that they felt that the time allocated to the task by the audit manager
was significantly less reasonable (𝑥̅ = 5.05 on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and
10 = “Strongly Agree”) than did participants in the implemental mindset condition (𝑥̅ =
7.37) and the no documentation condition (𝑥̅ = 6.70), with a p-value for the difference of
0.008.
I also asked participants if they would have spent more time on the audit if the
audit manager had budgeted more time for the task. Participants in the deliberative
mindset condition indicated significantly higher agreement with this question (𝑥̅ = 6.84
on a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 10 = “Strongly Agree”) than did
participants in the implemental mindset condition (𝑥̅ = 4.63) and the no documentation
condition (𝑥̅ = 4.95), with a p-value for the difference of 0.017. The probable reason for
these differences can be demonstrated by observing the number of evidence searches
conducted between conditions. Participants in the deliberative mindset condition
executed the maximum number of evidence searches nine times while participants in the
other two conditions executed the maximum number of searches only four times each. In
contrast, participants in the implemental mindset condition finished the task after the first
evidence search eight times while participants in the deliberative mindset and no
documentation conditions finished after the first search only three times combined.
Figure 5 graphically displays a breakdown of the number of additional searches by
experimental condition.
Although each of these variables that differs between conditions will be analyzed
as potential covariates, there are two additional variables that have a sound theoretical
basis for covarying with the dependent variables. First, I asked participants the extent
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that they trusted the information provided by the client. On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = “Do
Not Trust at All” and 10 = “Highly Trust”), participants in the deliberative mindset
condition claimed that they trusted the client’s information less (𝑥̅ = 4.16) than did
participants in the implemental mindset condition (𝑥̅ = 7.11) and the no documentation
condition (𝑥̅ = 6.25), with a p-value for the difference of 0.000. This finding is consistent
with the ex ante notion that trust would be lower in someone who is more skeptical.
Second, I asked participants to rate the overall riskiness of the client using a tenpoint scale where 1 is set to “Not Risky at All” and 10 is set to “Very Risky.”
Participants in the implemental mindset condition reported the lowest assessments of risk
(𝑥̅ = 4.05). The participants in the deliberative mindset condition reported the highest
assessments of risk (𝑥̅ = 7.74). The p-value for the difference in conditions is 0.000.
This difference is consistent with Taylor and Gollwitzer’s (1995) finding that individuals
in a deliberative mindset better attend to risk factors.
5.2 Tests for Differences in Testing Location
I collected responses from the auditors in person whenever possible. However, 28
participants (48.3-percent of the participants) completed the study on their own time due
to firm requests or logistical problems. 11 I test for differences in demographic variables,
dependent variables, and potential covariates between these two groups. These
differences are displayed in Table 5.3. I find that there are significant differences
between the groups in two of the demographic variables: the type of firm for which they
are employed and the number of years of general work experience.
For example, I attempted to conduct the study in person at one firm but found that the firm’s internet
security suite blocked participant access to my study’s website. These participants had to complete the
study on their own time and on their own computers.
11
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The first difference is not surprising because I conducted the study onsite with all
the smaller accounting firms (local, regional, and national firms) represented in my
sample and only some of the largest accounting firms (international firms). In contrast,
all 28 participants who completed the study on their own represented large, international
accounting firms. The difference in general work experience is likely attributable to
outliers in this variable. Of the 14 participants noting that they had greater than 10 years
of general work experience, only three completed the study on their own time. Further,
two participants that completed the study onsite reported general work experience of 25
and 30 years, respectively.
I include testing location as a control variable in my supplemental analyses. The
results do not differ when this variable is included in any of the tests discussed below.
5.3 Discussion of the Efficacy of the Experimental Manipulations
A key aspect of this paper is that there is a relation between high-level construals,
the deliberative mindset, and increased psychological distance and professional
skepticism. Further, there should be a relation between low-level construals, the
implemental mindset, and decreased psychological distance and professional skepticism.
I use procedures and instructions from prior construal-level theory literature that have
been designed to push an individual into a specific mindset.
I draw the wording for the deliberative mindset condition from prior construallevel theory literature which shows that thinking broadly about a situation and why the
situation occurred involves using high-level construals which increases the psychological
distance between a person and the situation and helps maintain a deliberative mindset
51

longer (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011). The participants in
the deliberative mindset condition saw the following wording when considering audit
evidence:
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why
management’s estimate could be fairly presented.
Thinking broadly about all of the evidence collectively, list reasons why
management’s estimate could be materially misstated.
The participants then entered their thoughts and reasons into separate textboxes for each
question.
I draw the wording for the implemental mindset condition from prior construallevel theory literature which shows that thinking about a situation with specific details of
the “how” of a situation involves using low-level construals which will decrease the
psychological distance between a person and a situation and will push the person into an
implemental mindset (Fujita et al. 2004, 2006; Rim et al. 2009; Backof et al. 2011). The
participants in the implemental mindset condition saw the following wording when
considering audit evidence:
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s
estimate could be fairly presented.
Thinking specifically about each evidence item, list reasons how management’s
estimate could be materially misstated.
The participants then entered their thoughts and reasons into separate textboxes for each
question.
In order to test the efficacy of these manipulations, participants completed an
exercise derived from Fujita, Trope, Liberman, and Levin-Sagi (2006) that helps capture
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the participant’s mindset.12 The participants considered eight situations and chose a
description of the situation from one of two choices. One choice contained a high-level
interpretation (construal) of the situation while the other contained a low-level
interpretation (construal) of the situation. Consistent with Fujita et al. (2006), I scored
each response as -1 if the participant chose the low-level interpretation and +1 if the
participant chose the high-level interpretation. The scores could thus range from a
minimum of -8 to a maximum of +8 with negative scores indicating an implemental
mindset and positive scores indicating a deliberative mindset.
Table 5.4 shows the breakdown of construal level by experimental condition.
Participants in the deliberative mindset condition had, on average, high, positive scores
(𝑥̅ = 6.11) which implies success with the deliberative mindset manipulation. I find
further evidence of the manipulation’s success in an examination of the minimum and
maximum scores for participants in this condition. The minimum score of any participant
in the deliberative mindset condition was zero which suggests that no participant in this
condition chose more low-level responses than high-level responses.
Participants in the implemental mindset condition had, on average, moderately
negative scores (𝑥̅ = -2.42) which is evidence of the success of the implemental mindset
manipulation. Participants in the no documentation condition averaged slightly positive
scores (𝑥̅ = 1.40) indicating that they might have been on boundary of the two mindsets.
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that the difference in scores between
conditions is significant (p-value = 0.000). Planned contrasts reveal that the construal

12

The Fujita et al. (2006) exercise has been used as a measure of mindset in a number of studies, including
Meyvis et al. (2012), Alter et al. (2010), and Schmeichel and Vohs (2009).
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scores are significantly higher in the deliberative mindset condition than in both the
implemental mindset condition (p-value = 0.000) and the no documentation condition (pvalue = 0.000).13 The contrasts also show that the construal scores are significantly lower
in the implemental mindset condition than in the no documentation condition (p-value =
0.008). Collectively, I take these results as indicators of the success of the experimental
manipulations.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics Regarding Dependent Variables and Potential Covariates
The study contains several dependent variables that can be used to make
inferences about auditors’ professional skepticism and how the level of skepticism affects
auditor judgment. I use five primary measures of professional skepticism. Consistent
with Montague (2010), two of these measures, assessments of the risk that the client’s
estimate is materially misstated and assessments of the likelihood that the participant
would recommend an adjustment of the client’s estimate, can be considered measures of
skeptical judgment. Following the definition of skeptical action used by Hurtt et al.
(2013), I measure skeptical action through the number of times participants searched for
additional audit evidence. I posit that the time spent searching for and reviewing
evidence and the total time spent on the study are also viable measures of skeptical
action. Table 5.5 displays univariate statistics for each of these measures.
The first dependent variable is the participants’ assessments of the risk that the
client’s estimate is materially misstated. The participants entered their responses on a
scale of 1 to 10 where 1 signified “Very Unlikely” and 10 signified “Very Likely.” As
The results of a Levene’s test reveal that the variances between these variables are not homogeneous.
Therefore, I use the results of the planned contrasts that do not assume equal variances. All p-values are
halved because the contrasts are one-tailed.
13
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shown in Table 5.5, participants in the deliberative mindset believed the risk to be higher
(𝑥̅ = 7.53) than did their counterparts in the implemental mindset (𝑥̅ = 4.00) and no
documentation (𝑥̅ = 4.25) conditions, respectively.
The second dependent variable is the participants’ assessments of the likelihood
that they would recommend an adjustment to the client’s estimate. The participants
entered their responses on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 signified “Very Unlikely” and 10
signified “Very Likely.” Participants in the deliberative mindset condition indicated the
highest likelihood of recommending an adjustment (𝑥̅ = 6.74). The participants in the
implemental mindset condition indicated the lowest likelihood of recommending an
adjustment (𝑥̅ = 3.16).
The third dependent variable is the time spent on the search for and review of
audit evidence portion of the task. As shown in Table 5.5, participants in the deliberative
mindset condition spent the most time searching for evidence with an average of 16.6
minutes per participant. Participants in the implemental mindset condition spent the
second most time searching for evidence with an average of 11.2 minutes per participant.
Participants in the no documentation condition spent the least amount of time searching
for evidence, with an average of 5.1 minutes per participant.
On the surface it may seem strange that participants in the no documentation
condition spent the least amount of time searching (𝑥̅ = 5.1 minutes per participant) even
though they conducted about the same number of searches as participants in the
deliberative mindset condition. This apparent oddity is easily explained by returning to
the description of the experimental task. Participants in the no documentation condition
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did not have to enter their thoughts and/or reasons for why the client’s estimate could be
fairly presented or materially misstated. Not having the documentation requirement
likely resulted in faster searches for and reviews of evidence.
The fourth dependent variable is the total time spent on the entire study. Once
again, participants in the deliberative mindset condition spent the most time out of all the
conditions with an average of 26.7 minutes per participant. Participants in the
implemental mindset condition averaged 19.1 minutes per participant while participants
in the no documentation condition spent the least amount of time on the study (𝑥̅ = 17.6
minutes per participant) likely due to the reasons described above. The data show,
however, that the difference in time spent between participants in the implemental
mindset condition and participants in the no documentation condition decreased with this
measure. One possible reason is that participants in the no documentation condition had
to spend more time formulating their thoughts after the search portion of the task while
participants in the other conditions had been formulating their thoughts during the search
portion of the task. I find evidence for this reason in the fact that participants in the no
documentation condition spent almost three minutes more, on average, responding to the
dependent variable questions than did participants in the implemental mindset condition,
a difference that is statistically significant (p-value of 0.000, untabulated).
The final dependent variable is the number of searches for audit evidence
conducted by each participant. As discussed in Section 5.1, participants in the
deliberative mindset, on average, conducted the greatest number of evidence searches (𝑥̅
= 2.63). Participants in the no documentation condition conducted slightly less searches
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on average (𝑥̅ = 2.50), while participants in the implemental mindset condition conducted
the fewest number of searches (𝑥̅ = 1.37).
Table 5.6 shows the correlations between the dependent variables. Not
surprisingly, participant responses for the risk that the client’s estimate is materially
misstated and responses for the likelihood of recommending an adjustment to the client’s
estimate are highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.844). Likewise, the
time spent searching for audit evidence and the total time spent on the study are highly
correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.926). The high correlations between the
dependent variables suggest that a multivariate approach such as MANOVA should be
considered for testing the hypotheses. Also, the high correlations between the number of
searches variable and both the search time variable (Pearson correlation coefficient =
0.554) and the total time variable (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.612) support my
claim that the time variables can be considered measures of skeptical action. 14
I next examine the correlations between the dependent variables and potential
covariates (described in Section 5.1). Table 5.7 displays these correlations. A few
covariates are highly correlated with the dependent variables, including trust in the
information provided by the client, the belief that the time allocated by the audit manager
was reasonable, and perceptions of the client’s riskiness.
In order to be considered as a possible covariate in an analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA), the potential covariate should be highly correlated with the dependent
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A factor analysis provides further support for this claim. The search time, total time, and number of
searches variables all load onto the same factor, with loadings of 0.948, 0.965, and 0.754, respectively. The
assessment of misstatement risk and the likelihood of an adjustment variables load onto a second factor,
with loadings of 0.946 and 0.967, respectively.
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variable(s) but not correlated with the independent variable(s) because this correlation
would be a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of regression (Huitema 2011).
Table 5.7 shows that the three covariates mentioned above are significantly correlated
with the independent variable. Thus, I will not include these variables in the subsequent
analysis. 15
I also test for possible effects of including demographic variables in the analysis.
I first examine the correlations between the dependent variables and the demographic
variables. None of the demographic variables are significantly correlated with the
measures of skeptical judgment (risk of material misstatement in the estimate and the
likelihood of recommending an adjustment).
I do note significant correlations between some of the demographic variables and
the measures of skeptical action. I find that the number of additional searches for audit
evidence variable is significantly correlated with the number of months of work
experience (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.307), a dummy variable that equals one if
the participant has experience auditing fair values (Pearson correlation coefficient =
0.268), the type of firm which employs the participant (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.271), and the participant’s position (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.276). The time
spent searching for and processing audit evidence dependent variable is significantly
correlated with the number of months of work experience ((Pearson correlation
coefficient = 0.280) and the type of firm which employs the participant (Pearson
correlation coefficient = -0.339). The total time spent on the experiment dependent
15

I also examined interactions between the covariates and the independent variable. The interactions are
significant which further suggests that the inclusion of these covariates in an ANCOVA model would
violate the homogeneity of regression assumption.
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variable is significantly associated with gender (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.270)
suggesting that females spent less time), the number of months of work experience
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.372), the number of months of audit experience
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.318) and the type of firm which employs the
participant (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.410).16 The inclusion of these variables,
either separately or collectively, does not significantly affect the results described below
or the inferences drawn from those results.
5.5 Assumption Testing
5.5.1 Assumptions for Hypotheses 1 and 2
I consider the use of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for
Hypotheses 1 and 2 because of the high correlations between the dependent variables
noted in the previous section. I plan to combine the two time variables (time spent
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and total time spent on the study) and the
misstatement risk and likelihood of recommending an adjustment variables, respectively,
given the high correlations between the variables within each pair. 17 MANOVA
effectively combines two or more dependent variables and creates a composite mean
based on the variables. These composite means, also known as mean vectors or
centroids, are then compared with one another in an analysis similar to a univariate
ANOVA (Sheskin 2004)
16

The variable which captures the type of firm which employs the participant is coded zero for local
accounting firms, one for regional accounting firms, two for national accounting firms, and three for
international accounting firms. Interestingly, these correlations suggest that larger accounting firms are
associated with lower skeptical actions
17
I do not include the number of searches variable with the time variables because, as will be discussed in
Section 5.6.1, there are problems interpreting the time variables between the mindset conditions and the no
documentation condition. The inclusion of the number of searches variable in the MANOVA analysis
using the time variables does not change the inferences drawn from the results.
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MANOVA is superior to ANOVA when two or more dependent variables are
highly correlated for several reasons. First, MANOVA avoids the inflated Type I error
rate that can result from employing multiple tests of the dependent variables separately.
Second, MANOVA takes the correlations into account when computing the MANOVA
test statistic. Third, MANOVA has more power to detect a significant effect based on the
composite mean than does ANOVA in detecting effects of the singular dependent
variables (Sheskin 2004; Stevens 1996).
MANOVA has five assumptions that should be met. First, the dependent
variables should be normally distributed. Second, the variances and covariances of the
dependent variables should be homogeneous (homogeneity of the variance-covariance
matrices). Third, the observations must be independent. Fourth, there should be linear
relationships between all pairs of dependent variables and potential covariates. Finally,
cell sizes should be approximately equal (Finch 2005; Stevens 1996).
One of the assumptions of multivariate analysis is that the data are normally
distributed. I test for normality using two statistical tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (with
Lilliefors significance correction) and Shapiro-Wilk. Nonsignificant results from these
tests suggest that the data are normally distributed. Table 5.8 displays these results which
suggest that all five of my dependent variables are not normally distributed. Recent
studies suggest, however, that ANOVA and, by extension, MANOVA are robust to
violations of the normal distribution assumption and can outperform nonparametric
versions of ANOVA when only this assumption is violated and the non-normality is
caused by skewness rather than by outliers (Schmider et al. 2010; Finch 2005; Stevens
1996).
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I begin searching for possible outliers by examining histograms and boxplots of
the data. Neither the boxplots nor the histograms for the number of evidence searches,
misstatement risk, or adjustment likelihood variables indicate potential outliers. My
visual interpretation is confirmed by examining Cook’s D scores and leverage scores as
well as by applying the outlier labeling rule described in Hoaglin et al. (1986).
Visual analysis of the histograms for time spent during the search phase of the
study and for the total time spent on the study reveals that the data are heavily skewed to
the left and that there could be one outlier. Neither of the boxplots suggests that this
observation could be an outlier and an examination of Cook’s D scores and leverage
scores confirms this suggestion. I also apply the outlier labeling rule because the data are
not normally distributed (Hoaglin et al. 1986). Applying this rule does not suggest that
there is an influential outlier in the data. I conclude that the use of MANOVA is still
appropriate provided that none of the other assumptions are violated.
I employ two tests of the homogeneity of the dependent variables’ variancecovariance matrices: Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices and Levene’s test of
equality of error variances. Box’s test produces a statistic based on the combination of
the correlated dependent variables while Levene’s test produces a statistic based on the
individual dependent variables.
Panel A of Table 5.9 shows the results of the Box’s tests for the pairings of the
time variables and the risk/likelihood variables. Both results suggest that the null
hypothesis of equal observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables across
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conditions should be rejected. Thus, it appears that the homogeneity of the variancecovariance matrices will also be violated.
The impact of this violation is minimal in MANOVA when cell sizes are
approximately equal (Stevens 1996). However, additional evidence of this violation can
be found in Panel B of Table 5.9. The Levene’s tests suggest that there could be equal
error variances in the risk of material misstatement and likelihood of recommending an
adjustment dependent variables; however, the statistical significance of the time variables
reveals that the error variances are not likely to be equal across conditions in those
variables.
MANOVA assumes that each of the observations is independent (Finch 2005). I
achieve independence by randomly assigning participants to the experimental conditions.
MANOVA also assumes that there is a linear relation between the proposed pairings of
the dependent variables. I confirm the linearity of both sets of proposed dependent
variables couplings (the time variables and the risk/likelihood variables) through visual
analysis of scatterplots. Further evidence of linearity is provided in the high correlations
between these variables noted in section 5.4. Finally, my cell sizes are approximately
equal (19, 19, and 20).
In conclusion, the data violate two of the MANOVA assumptions: the assumption
of normality and the assumption of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices.
Finch (2005) shows that nonparametric MANOVA outperforms parametric MANOVA
when both the normality and the homogeneity assumptions are not met. Specifically,
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nonparametric MANOVA has a lower Type I error rate and higher power than its
parametric equivalent.
Following this finding, I conclude that nonparametric MANOVA is the
appropriate statistical method for analyzing the dependent variables that are highly
correlated. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric test used for ANOVA that can
also be used for MANOVA (Finch 2005). I will run planned contrasts to test for specific
differences between experimental conditions. I will use a median test and individual
ANOVAs (parametric and nonparametric) to test the robustness of the nonparametric
MANOVA. Finally, I will include any covariate that has a correlation of greater than
|0.400| in supplemental analyses.
As discussed earlier, I consider the number of searches for audit evidence variable
in a separate analysis because of possible interpretation difficulties that may arise from
comingling the time variables with this variable. In order to further test Hypotheses 1
and 2, I plan to use a one-way ANOVA using the number of searches variable. The
assumptions of ANOVA are largely the same as the assumptions for MANOVA.
As shown previously in Table 5.8, the data in the number of searches dependent
variable are not normally distributed; however, ANOVA is robust to violations of the
normality assumptions (Finch 2005; Stevens 1996). Panel B of Table 5.9 shows a
nonsignificant value for the Levene’s test which indicates that I should fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the error variances are equal across conditions in this variable.
Finally, I achieve independence of the observations by randomly assigning participants to
the experimental conditions. I conclude that a one-way ANOVA is the appropriate
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statistical test for this variable and will supplement this test with planned contrasts
between experimental conditions.
5.5.2. Assumptions for Hypothesis 3
I examine the coding of the textual responses entered by the participants in my
analysis of Hypothesis 3. Recall that the independent coders assigned a value of +1 if a
set of responses indicated broad, abstract thinking (consistent with the deliberative
mindset and high-level construals. The coders assigned a value of -1 if a set of responses
indicated specific, detailed thinking (indicative of the implemental mindset and low-level
construals).
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a greater likelihood of one type of response over
another between experimental conditions. Hypothesis 4a predicts that participants in the
deliberative mindset condition will be more likely to enter broad, abstract responses than
will participants in the implemental mindset condition. Similarly, Hypothesis 4b predicts
that participants in the implemental mindset condition will be more likely to enter
specific, detailed responses than will participants in the deliberative mindset condition. 18
Given that I collect multiple responses from each participant over time and that
the coding is bivariate, the appropriate statistical test would appear to be repeated
measures logistic regression. Each participant had the option of continuing the search for
evidence up to four times, however, which lead to a nonuniform number of responses
18

Note that I do not include the no documentation participants in this analysis. Participants in the no
documentation condition only entered one set of textual responses after concluding their search and
responding to the initial dependent variable questions. Mindset theory would suggest that individuals at
this stage of the decision process will have already entered the implemental mindset. Thus, the responses
entered here cannot be directly compared with responses entered in the predecisional portion of the task. I
reveal the types of responses given by these participants in a later section but do not include these
responses in the statistical analysis.
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between participants. The number of responses range from one (indicating a participant
that did not conduct any additional searches) to five (indicating a participant that
conducted the maximum number of searches). As previously shown in Table 5.5,
participants varied greatly in the number of searches they conducted. The nonuniform
number of repeated measures precludes the use of repeated measures logistic regression.
I next examine the raw number of responses of each type entered by participants
in each condition. Panel A of Table 5.10 reveals the number of (percentage of) responses
of each type entered by participants collectively in each condition.19 Note that the total
number of responses is different between the experimental conditions. As a result, I
cannot test for differences using the raw numbers.
I convert the raw numbers into proportions (percentages). The conversion of the
raw numbers into proportions helps standardize the data to make analysis between the
two conditions easier. These proportions, displayed in Panel B of Table 5.10, are the
proportions (standard deviations) of each type of response by participant calculated by
taking the number of each type of response (broad and abstract or detailed and specific)
entered by each participant and dividing that number by the total number of responses
entered by each participant. In other words, if a participant entered three responses coded
as +1, -1, and +1, respectively, that participant would be said to have a broad, abstract
proportion of 66.7 percent and a detailed, specific proportion of 33.3 percent.
A paired t-test is inappropriate for this analysis because the proportion dependent
variable is not strictly continuous. Further, normality tests indicate that the data in the

19

As noted in footnote 13, I include the responses of participants in the no documentation condition for
informational purposes only. These responses are not included in the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 3.
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implemental mindset condition are not normally distributed. I thus consider a
nonparametric form of the t-test, the Mann-Whitney test.
The assumptions of the Mann-Whitney test are twofold: that the two samples are
random and independent and that the dependent variable is intrinsically continuous
(Sheskin 2004). The first assumption is satisfied through my experimental design in
which participants are randomly placed into conditions. The second assumption is
satisfied with the use of a proportion dependent variable in which one can determine
whether one observation’s value is greater than another (Sheskin 2004). I conclude that
the Mann-Whitney test is the appropriate statistical test of Hypothesis 3.
There are two experimental conditions tested (deliberative mindset condition and
implemental mindset condition). The proportion variable shows the proportion of one
type of response over a second type of response. Given these two facts, the MannWhitney test will test both hypotheses simultaneously because testing for differences in
the proportion of broad, abstract responses between conditions is the same as testing for
differences in the proportion of detailed, specific responses between conditions. 20

20

For example, consider the case where participants in the deliberative mindset condition averaged 60percent broad, abstract responses while participants in the implemental mindset condition averaged 30percent broad, abstract responses. By extension, participants in the deliberative mindset condition would
average 40-percent detailed, specific responses while participants in the implemental mindset condition
would average 70-percent detailed, specific responses. Testing for differences between 60-percent and 30percent is the same statistically as testing for differences between 40-percent and 70-percent when the cell
sizes are equal.
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5.6 Tests of Hypotheses
5.6.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2
Hypothesis 1 collectively predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset will display higher professional skepticism than will
auditors receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset
or auditors not required to document evidence. Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors
receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will display lower
professional skepticism than will auditors not required to document evidence. Recall that
I use multiple measures of professional skepticism: assessments of the risk of material
misstatement in the client’s estimate, assessments of the likelihood that the auditor would
recommend an adjustment of the estimate, the time spent searching for and reviewing
audit evidence, the total time spent on the study, and the number of searches for
additional audit evidence. The first two variables are measures of skeptical judgment
while the remaining three variables measure skeptical action.
I first analyze the skeptical judgment variables using a Kruskal-Wallis test. Panel
A of Table 5.11 reveals the mean ranks assigned to each variable by experimental
condition. Panel B displays the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for differences in these
mean ranks. Both the risk of misstatement and the likelihood of recommending an
adjustment variables are significantly different between conditions with p-values of 0.000
and 0.001, respectively. 21

Recall that although the Box’s Test suggested that the judgment dependent variables failed the
homogeneity assumption, the Levene’s tests of the individual variables suggested that the variables meet
the homogeneity assumption. Finch (2005) shows that parametric MANOVA outperforms nonparametric
21
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I test the robustness of these results with a median test. The results of the median
test can be found in Panel C of Table 5.11. Both of the dependent variables are
statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.001 for the risk of misstatement variable and a
p-value of 0.030 for the likelihood of recommending an adjustment variable.
Additionally, I run the dependent variables through a one-way ANOVA (non-tabulated)
and find that each of the dependent variables is statistically significant with a p-value of
0.000 in each case.
These tests reveal that there are differences in the judgment dependent variables
between conditions but do not reveal where these differences can be found. I therefore
use planned contrasts to provide additional information that can be used to address
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Panel A of Table 5.12 displays the results of planned contrasts of
the risk of misstatement variable.
The first contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the deliberative
mindset condition is higher than the assessed risk of misstatement in the implemental
mindset condition. The significant p-value of 0.000 reveals that the difference in
assessed risk is significantly different between these two conditions, with assessments in
the deliberative mindset being significantly higher. This result provides support for
Hypothesis 1a.
The second contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the deliberative
mindset condition is higher than the assessed risk of misstatement in the no

MANOVA when the normality assumption is not met but the data meet the homogeneity assumption. I
therefore use parametric MANOVA for these two variables to confirm the results. The results (nontabulated) of the MANOVA are consistent with the results of the nonparametric MANOVA, with a Fstatistic (Pillai’s Trace) of 6.378 and a p-value of 0.000.
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documentation condition. I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition
assessed a significantly higher risk than did auditors in the no documentation condition
(p-value of 0.000). This result provides support for Hypothesis 1b. The collective results
of these two planned contrasts provide significant support for Hypothesis 1.
The third contrast tests that the assessed risk of misstatement in the implemental
mindset condition is lower than the assessed risk of misstatement in the no
documentation condition. The difference between the assessments in these two
conditions is only 0.25. The nonsignificant results are not surprising, then, as I fail to
find support for Hypothesis 2 with this dependent variables (p-value of 0.364).
I repeat the analyses above using the two time dependent variables: time spent
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and total time spent on the study. I begin by
running a Kruskal-Wallis test using these two variables. Panel A of Table 5.13 displays
the mean ranks of the two dependent variables by experimental condition. Panel B
reveals that the mean ranks are significantly different between conditions, with a p-value
of 0.000 for the time spent searching for audit evidence variable and a p-value of 0.002
for the total time spent on the study variable.
I again test the robustness of these results with a median test. The results of the
median test can be found in Panel C of Table 5.13. Both of the dependent variables are
statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.000 for the time spent searching for evidence
variable and a p-value of 0.001 for the total time spent on the study variable.
Additionally, I run the dependent variables through a one-way ANOVA (non-tabulated)
and find that each of the dependent variables is statistically significant with a p-value of
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0.000 for the time spent searching for evidence variable and a p-value of 0.008 for the
total time spent on the study variable.
I use planned contrasts to identify the differences in these variables. Panel A of
Table 5.14 reveals the results for the time spent searching for audit evidence variable.
The first contrast tests that the auditors in the deliberative mindset condition spent more
time searching for and reviewing audit evidence than did the auditors in the implemental
mindset conditions. The difference of 5.49 minutes is statistically significant with a pvalue of 0.043. This result provides additional support for Hypothesis 1a.
Support for Hypothesis 1b can be found in the second contrast which tests for
differences in time spent between auditors in the deliberative mindset condition and
auditors in the no documentation condition. This contrast reveals a statistically
significant difference in time spent of 11.50 (p-value of 0.000); however, this result
should be interpreted with caution. Recall that auditors in the no documentation
condition did not have to document the audit evidence they uncovered. This difference
between experimental conditions could be driving the significant result.
The third contrast tests for differences in time spent searching for and reviewing
audit evidence between auditors in the implemental mindset condition and auditors in the
no documentation condition. The difference of 6.01 minutes is statistically significant (pvalue of 0.022). Again, this result should be interpreted with caution.
I next examine planned contrasts using the total time spent on the study variable.
The results of these contrasts can be found in Panel B of Table 5.14. I find further
support for Hypothesis 1a in the results of the first contrast. This contrasts tests for a
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significant difference in total time spent on the study between auditors in the deliberative
mindset condition and auditors in the implemental mindset condition. The difference of
7.59 minutes is statistically significant (p-value of 0.017).
Likewise, the second planned contrast reveals a significant difference. Auditors
in the deliberative mindset condition spent an average of 9.09 more minutes on the study
than did participants in the no documentation condition. This difference is significant (pvalue of 0.000) and supports Hypothesis 1b, but the difference can again be attributable
to differences in the experimental conditions. Overall, the results of these two contrasts
combined with the results of the first two contrasts of the judgment variables and the first
time variable provide collective strong support for Hypothesis 1. The final planned
contrast of these variables is a test for the difference in time spent between auditors in the
implemental mindset condition and auditors in the no documentation condition. The
difference of 1.51 minutes is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.330).
I conclude my tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 by examining the number of additional
searches for audit evidence conducted by participants between experimental conditions.
Recall that each auditor could conduct up to four more searches beyond the initial search
for audit evidence. I test for differences in the number of searches conducted between
conditions using a one-way ANOVA.
Panel A of Table 5.15 shows the results of the ANOVA. There is a significant
difference between the mean number of searches conducted in the three experimental
conditions (p-value of 0.014). I test for the specific differences using planned contrasts.
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The results of the planned contrasts can be found in Panel B of Table 5.15. The
first contrast reveals that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition conducted 1.26
more searches, on average, than did their counterparts in the implemental mindset
condition. This difference is statistically significant (p-value of 0.004) and provides
further support for Hypothesis 1a.
The second contrast shows that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition
conducted only 0.13 more searches, on average, than auditors in the no documentation
condition. This result is not significant (p-value of 0.386) and provides no additional
support for Hypothesis 1b. This lack of a finding is curious considering that auditors in
the deliberative mindset condition displayed higher professional skepticism than auditors
in the no documentation condition with the measures of professional skepticism
discussed earlier.
One possible reason why auditors in these two conditions do not differ in their
number of searches could be a difference in their perceptions of the task difficulty. As
previously shown in Table 5.2, auditors in the deliberative mindset condition perceived
the task as significantly more difficult than auditors in the other two conditions.
However, Table 5.7 shows a nonsignificant correlation between experimental condition
and task difficulty.
In order to more definitively test my conjecture, I test for this correlation again
using only participants from the deliberative mindset and no documentation conditions.
This time I find a negative correlation between experimental condition and task difficulty
just short of conventional significance (p-value = 0.055). The change from almost no
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relation to a moderately significant relation provides fuel for future research into the
possible relation between task difficulty and professional skepticism.
The final contrast shows that auditors in the implemental mindset condition
conducted 1.13 fewer searches for evidence than did auditors in the no documentation
condition. This result provides support for Hypothesis 2 and exhibits further evidence
that the implemental mindset could be inhibiting professional skepticism.
5.6.2 Tests of Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3a predicts that auditors receiving documentation instructions
designed to invoke a deliberative mindset will be more likely to enter broad, abstract
responses to the documentation questions than will auditors receiving instructions
designed to invoke an implemental mindset. Hypothesis 3b predicts that auditors
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset will be
more likely to enter specific, detailed responses to the documentation questions than will
auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a deliberative mindset.
In terms of raw numbers, participants in the deliberative mindset condition
responded with a larger percentage of broad, abstract responses. As shown in Table 5.10,
deliberative mindset participants responded with a broad, abstract response 62.2 percent
of the time. In contrast, implemental mindset participants responded with broad, abstract
responses only 34.16 percent of the time. Participants in the deliberative mindset
condition responded with detailed, specific responses 37.8 percent of the time as
compared with 65.84 percent of the time by implemental mindset participants.
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I test both of the hypotheses simultaneously using a Mann-Whitney test.22 Panel
A of Table 5.16 shows the mean ranks for both experimental conditions. The results of
the Mann-Whitney test shown in Panel B suggest that there is a significant difference
between the proportion of broad, abstract responses delivered by the auditors in the
deliberative mindset condition and auditors in the implemental mindset condition. By
extension, there must also be a significant difference between the proportion of detailed,
specific responses by auditors in the respective conditions. Hypothesis 3 is supported.23

22

Recall from section 5.5.3 that both hypotheses are tested simultaneously because the dependent variable
is a proportion between two possible outcomes.
23
I confirm these results by using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. Further, because the main
reason why I could not use repeated measure logistic regression is the fact that the number of repeated
measures is different between participants, I also use a generalized estimating equation which allows for
missing data. I continue to find support for Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 5 – Number of Additional Evidence Searches by Condition
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TABLE 5.1. Participant Demographic Statistics

Deliberative Implemental
Mindset
Mindset
Condition
Condition
Mean (s.d. or Mean (s.d. or
percent of
percent of
sample)
sample)
(n = 19)
(n = 19)

No
documentation
Condition
Mean (s.d. or
percent of
sample)
(n = 20)

Total
Mean
(s.d. or
percent
of
sample)
(n = 58)

Gender

p-value

0.529

Male

10 (52.6%)

11 (57.9%)

8 (40.0%)

Female

9 (47.4%)

8 (42.1%)

12 (60.0%)

28.05
(4.034)

29.89
(4.267)

30.70
(5.823)

29
(50.0%)
29
(50.0%)
29.57
(4.842)

7.11
(5.322)

8.42
(6.086)

9.35
(6.930)

8.31
(6.125)

0.526

4.63
(3.095)

5.26
(4.107)

6.25
(5.077)

5.40
(4.171)

0.481

16
(84%)

17
(89%)

19
(95%)

52
(90%)

0.556

131.74
(16.251)

124.05
(16.092)

133.15
(17.942)

129.71
(16.990)

0.204

Age
General
work
experience
(years)
Audit work
experience
(years)
Experience
auditing fair
value
estimates
Hurtt
professional
skepticism
score
Auditor rank

0.221

0.496

Staff

3 (15.8%)

2 (10.5%)

3 (15.0%)

Senior

13 (68.4%)

12 (63.2%)

10 (50.0%)

Manager

3 (15.8%)

4 (21.1%)

6 (30.0%)

Partner
Firm Type
Local

0 (0.0%)

1 (5.2%)

1 (5.0%)

8
(13.8%)
35
(60.3%)
13
(22.4%)
2 (3.5%)

1 (5.3%)

1 (5.3%)

2 (10.0%)

4 (6.9%)

0.923
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Table 5.1 (Continued)
Regional

3 (15.8%)

3 (15.8%)

2 (10.0%)

National

0 (0.0%)

1 (5.3%)

2 (10.0%)

15 (78.9%)

14 (73.7%)

14 (70.0%)

International
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8
(13.8%)
3 (5.2%)
43
(74.1%)

TABLE 5.2. Participant Responses to Post-Experimental Questionnaire

Confidence in
assessment
Trust
information
provided by
client
Time allocated
by manager
reasonable
Difficulty of
task (lower =
harder)
Comfort taking
as many audit
hours as
necessary
Client
importance
Motivation to
finish task in as
few audit hours
as possible
Task realism
Client riskiness
Satisfied that
evidence
gathered was
sufficient to
form opinion
Would have
spent more
time on task if
more hours
budgeted

Deliberative
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

Implemental
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

6.84
(2.192)

No
documentation
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 20)

Total
Mean (s.d.
or percent
of sample)
(n = 58)

7.58
(1.644)

7.75
(1.118)

7.40
(1.716)

0.204

4.16
(1.740)

7.11
(2.233)

6.25
(1.372)

5.84
(2.167)

0.000

5.05
(2.223)

7.37
(2.650)

6.70
(1.922)

6.38
(2.441)

0.008

5.95
(2.013)

7.21
(2.417)

7.40
(1.789)

6.86
(2.013)

0.049

6.00
(2.809)

7.05
(1.840)

7.40
(1.789)

6.83
(2.233)

0.127

8.89
(1.595)

9.00
(1.374)

8.95
(1.050)

8.95
(1.330)

0.972

5.63
(1.921)

5.95
(2.656)

4.95
(2.800)

5.50
(2.487)

0.447

8.32
(1.797)
7.74
(1.939)

7.26
(2.941)
4.05
(2.248)

7.20
(2.238)
5.60
(1.231)

7.59
(2.384)
5.79
(2.360)

6.95
(2.068)

7.26
(2.806)

7.15
(2.110)

7.12
(2.310)

0.916

6.84
(3.023)

4.63
(2.033)

4.95
(2.305)

5.47
(2.631)

0.017
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pvalue

0.270
0.000

TABLE 5.3 Tests for Differences in Testing Location
At Firm
Mean (s.d. or
percent of sample)
(n = 30)
Gender
Male
Female
Age
General work
experience (years)
Audit work
experience (years)
Experience auditing
fair value estimates
Hurtt professional
skepticism score
Auditor rank
Staff
Senior
Manager
Partner
Firm Type
Local
Regional
National
International

On Own Time
Mean (s.d. or
percent of sample)
(n = 28)

p-value

1.000
15 (50.0%)
15 (50.0%)
30.17
(4.893)
10.07
(7.187)
6.23
(4.847)

14 (50.0%)
14 (50.0%)
28.93
(4.791)
6.43
(4.077)
4.50
(3.145)

26 (86.7%)

26 (92.9%)

0.448

133.37
(15.690)

125.79
(17.725)

0.090

0.335
0.022
0.115

0.381
4 (13.3%)
16 (53.3%)
9 (30.0%)
1 (3.3%)

4 (14.3%)
19 (67.9%)
4 (14.3%)
1 (3.6%)
0.000

4 (13.3%)
8 (26.7%)
3 (10.0%)
15 (50.0%)

0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
28 (100.0%)
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TABLE 5.4. Participant Construal Levels
Panel A: Participant Construal Level by Experimental Condition

Construal
level (min -8;
max +8)

Deliberative
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

Implemental
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

No
documentation
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 20)

6.11
(2.536)

-2.42
(5.480)

1.40
(3.560)

Total
Mean
(s.d.)
(n = 58)
1.69
(5.282)

pvalue

0.000

Panel B: Planned Contrasts
Contrast*

Difference

Std.
Error

t-statistic

df

p-value
(onetailed)

Deliberative
Mindset >
8.53
1.385
6.154
25.372
0.000
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
4.71
0.986
4.772
34.370
0.000
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
3.82
1.488
2.568
30.657
0.008
documentation
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the
third contrast.
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TABLE 5.5. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables

Risk of material
misstatement
Likelihood of
recommending an
adjustment
Time spent searching
for and reviewing
audit evidence (in
minutes)
Total time spent on
the study (in minutes)
Number of searches

Deliberative
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

Implemental
Mindset
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 19)

7.53
(2.245)

No
documentation
Condition
Mean (s.d.)
(n = 20)

Total
Mean (s.d.
or percent
of sample)
(n = 58)

4.00
(2.380)

4.25
(2.074)

5.24
(2.723)

6.74
(2.997)

3.16
(2.522)

4.00
(2.103)

4.62
(2.943)

16.65
(6.371)

11.15
(11.778)

5.14
(2.973)

10.88
(9.067)

26.68
(6.407)
2.63
(1.535)

19.09
(13.312)
1.37
(1.571)

17.59
(6.470)
2.50
(1.100)

21.06
(9.946)
2.17
(1.500)
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Table 5.6. Correlations Between Dependent Variables*
Time
spent
searching
for and
Risk of
Likelihood of reviewing Total time
material
recommending
audit
spent on
Number of
misstatement an adjustment
evidence
the study
searches
Risk of material
0.844
0.509
0.454
0.453
1
misstatement
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Likelihood of
0.815
0.304
0.286
0.393
recommending
1
(0.000)
(0.020)
(0.029)
(0.002)
an adjustment
Time spent
searching for
0.567
0.439
0.926
0.610
1
and reviewing
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
audit evidence
Total time spent
0.477
0.381
0.888
0.549
1
on the study
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Number of
0.442
0.433
0.554
0.612
1
searches
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
* - The figures above the diagonal are Pearson correlation coefficients (p-values). The
figures below the diagonal are Spearman’s rho coefficients (p-values).
Boldfaced values are significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 5.7. Correlations Between Dependent Variables, Independent Variable and Possible Covariates *

Client
importance

Motivation
to finish
task in as
few audit
hours as
possible

Task
realism

Client
riskiness

Satisfied
that
evidence
gathered
was
sufficient to
form
opinion

Would have
spent more
time on task
if more
hours
budgeted

Hurtt
professional
skepticism
score

Confidence
in
assessment

Trust
information
provided by
client

Time
allocated by
manager
reasonable

Difficulty
of task

Comfort
taking as
many audit
hours as
necessary

Risk of
material
misstatement

-0.186
-0.213

-0.588
-0.516

-0.423
-0.398

-0.272
-0.268

-0.250
-0.126

-0.147
-0.120

-0.142
-0.178

-0.025
-0.050

0.701
0.621

-0.339
-0.345

0.342
0.270

-0.114
-0.057

Likelihood
of
recommending an
adjustment

-0.154
-0.250

-0.593
-0.587

-0.402
-0.437

-0.273
-0.316

-0.379
-0.308

-0.157
-0.208

-0.029
-0.105

0.020
-0.064

0.746
0.727

-0.215
-0.333

0.334
0.280

-0.115
-0.033

-0.105
-0.189

-0.409
-0.523

-0.287
-0.381

-0.241
-0.335

-0.058
-0.093

-0.030
-0.052

-0.315
-0.352

-0.141
-0.141

0.436
0.587

-0.313
-0.382

0.301
0.220

0.139
0.192

-0.129
-0.155

-0.457
-0.525

-0.402
-0.456

-0.255
-0.300

-0.082
0.010

-0.039
-0.107

-0.438
-0.459

-0.249
-0.284

0.516
0.583

-0.350
-0.437

0.248
0.217

0.308
0.396

0.062
-0.069

-0.386
-0.352

-0.243
-0.233

-0.027
-0.046

-0.070
-0.015

-0.092
-0.106

-0.334
-0.329

-0.137
-0.145

0.501
0.423

-0.360
-0.376

0.250
0.222

0.193
0.206

0.218
0.159

0.393
0.422

0.275
0.269

0.297
0.271

0.258
0.218

0.017
-0.083

-0.115
-0.093

-0.192
-0.201

-0.367
-0.387

0.036
0.035

-0.294
-0.265

0.038
0.027

Time
spent
searching
for and
reviewing
audit
evidence
Total time
spent on
the study
Number of
searches
Mindset
Condition
(IV)

* - The figures displayed are Pearson correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho coefficients). Boldface indicates that the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 5.8. Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic
df
p-value
Risk of
material
misstatement
Likelihood of
recommending
an adjustment
Time spent
searching for
and reviewing
audit evidence
Total time
spent on the
study
Number of
searches

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
p-value

0.140

58

0.007

0.933

58

0.003

0.193

58

0.000

0.902

58

0.000

0.209

58

0.000

0.851

58

0.000

0.123

58

0.029

0.942

58

0.008

0.182

58

0.000

0.865

58

0.000
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Table 5.9. Tests of the Homogeneity of the Variance-Covariance Matrices
Panel A: Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices
Box’s M
F-statistic
df 1
Risk/likelihood
dependent
23.565
3.721
6
variables
Time
dependent
48.169
7.605
6
variables
Panel B: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances
F-statistic
df 1
Risk of material
0.530
2
misstatement
Likelihood of recommending
1.336
2
an adjustment
Time spent searching for and
16.788
2
reviewing audit evidence
Total time spent on the study
10.273
2
Number of searches
2.813
2
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df 2

p-value

74181.049

0.001

74181.049

0.000

df 2

p-value
55

0.591

55

0.271

55

0.000

55
55

0.000
0.069

Table 5.10. Breakdown of Textual Responses
Panel A: Breakdown by Experimental Condition
Deliberative
Implemental
mindset condition mindset condition
Number of
(Percent of)
92
44
broad,
(63.0%)
(40.7%)
abstract
responses
Number of
(Percent of)
54
64
detailed,
(37.0%)
(59.3%)
specific
responses
Total number
146
108
of responses
Panel B: Breakdown by Participant
Average
percentage
(std. dev.) of
0.6220 or 62.20%
broad,
(0.258)
abstract
responses (by
participant)
Average
percentage
(std. dev.) of
0.3780 or 37.80%
detailed,
(0.258)
specific
responses (by
participant)

No documentation
condition
12
(60.0%)

8
(40.0%)

20

0.3416 or 34.16%
(0.284)

0.6000 or 60.00%
(0.503)

0.6584 or 65.84%
(0.284)

0.4000 or 40.00%
(0.503)
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Table 5.11. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Judgment Dependent Variables
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Kruskal-Wallis Test
Mean rank (risk of
misstatement)
Deliberative
43.34
mindset condition
Implemental
21.82
mindset condition
No documentation
23.65
condition

Mean rank (likelihood of
recommending an adjustment)
41.00
20.34
27.28

Panel B: Results of Kruskal-Wallis Test
Chi-square
19.438
15.053

df
2
2

p-value
0.000
0.001

Median

Chi-square

df

p-value

6.00

14.482

2

0.001

4.50

7.042

2

0.030

Risk of misstatement
Likelihood of recommending an adjustment
Panel C: Results of a Median Test
N
Risk of
58
misstatement
Likelihood of
recommending an
58
adjustment
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Table 5.12. Planned Contrasts of Judgment Dependent Variables
Panel A: Planned Contrasts of Risk of Misstatement
Contrast*
Deliberative
Mindset >
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
documentation

Difference

Std. Error

t-statistic

df

p-value
(one-tailed)

3.53

0.725

4.865

55

0.000

3.28

0.716

4.578

55

0.000

0.25

0.716

0.349

55

0.364

Panel B: Planned Contrasts of Likelihood of Recommending an Adjustment
Contrast*

Difference

Std. Error

t-statistic

df

p-value
(one-tailed)

Deliberative
Mindset >
3.58
0.830
4.310
55
0.000
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
2.74
0.820
3.338
55
0.001
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
0.84
0.820
1.027
55
0.155
documentation
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third
contrast.
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Table 5.13. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Time Dependent Variables
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Kruskal-Wallis Test
Mean rank (time spent
searching for and
reviewing audit evidence)
Deliberative
43.47
mindset condition
Implemental
26.84
mindset condition
No documentation
18.75
condition

Mean rank (total time spent on the
study)
40.68
23.26
24.80

Panel B: Results of Kruskal-Wallis Test
Chi-square

df

p-value

21.587

2

0.000

12.476

2

0.002

Median

Chi-square

df

p-value

7.00

28.779

2

0.000

18.83

13.274

2

0.001

Time spent searching for and reviewing audit
evidence
Total time spent on the study
Panel C: Results of a Median Test
N
Time spent
searching for and
58
reviewing audit
evidence
Total time spent
58
on the study
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Table 5.14. Planned Contrasts of Time Dependent Variables
Panel A: Planned Contrasts of Time Spent Searching For and Reviewing Audit Evidence
p-value
Contrast*
Difference Std. Error
t-statistic
df
(one-tailed)
Deliberative
Mindset >
5.49
3.072
1.787
27.703
0.043
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
11.50
1.606
7.164
25.196
0.000
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
-6.01
2.783
-2.161
20.175
0.022
documentation
**
Panel B: Planned Contrasts of Total Time Spent on the Study
Contrast*

Difference

Std. Error

t-statistic

df

p-value
(one-tailed)

Deliberative
Mindset >
7.59
3.389
2.238
25.914
0.017
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
9.09
2.062
4.408
36.932
0.000
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
-1.51
3.379
-0.445
25.757
0.330
documentation
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third
contrast. I use the contrast results that do not assume equal variances.
** The significant difference found in this contrast shows the implemental mindset group
is significantly different from the no documentation group, but in the opposite direction
of the prediction.
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Table 5.15. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 – Number of Searches For Evidence
Dependent Variable
Panel A: Results of a One-Way ANOVA
Sum of
df
Squares
Between
18.434
2
Groups
Within
109.842
55
Groups
Total
128.276
57

Mean
Square
9.217

F-statistic

p-value

4.615

0.014

1.997

Panel B: Planned Contrasts
Contrast*

Difference

Std. Error

t-statistic

df

p-value
(one-tailed)

Deliberative
Mindset >
1.26
0.459
2.755
55
0.004
Implemental
Mindset
Deliberative
Mindset > No
0.13
0.453
0.291
55
0.386
documentation
Implemental
Mindset < No
1.13
0.453
2.499
55
0.008
documentation
* I use weights of +1, -1 for the first two contrasts, respectively, and -1, +1 for the third
contrast.
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Table 5.16. Tests of Hypothesis 3
Panel A: Mean Ranks from Mann-Whitney Test Using Proportion of Broad,
Abstract Responses
Mean rank (Percentage of
Sum of
broad, abstract responses by
ranks
participant)
Deliberative mindset condition
24.42
464.00
Implemental mindset condition
14.58
277.00
Panel B: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Using Proportion of Broad, Abstract
Responses
MannzWhitney
Wilcoxon W
p-value
statistic
U
Percentage of broad,
abstract responses by
87.000
277.000
-2.741
0.006
participant

92

6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary of Key Findings
This study tests for a relation between psychological distance, mindsets, and
professional skepticism. Regulators have criticized auditors for displaying a lack of
professional skepticism (PCAOB 2008; Bratten et al. 2013); accordingly, a goal of this
study is to test an intervention designed to prolong the deliberative mindset, a mindset
which can be theoretically and positively linked to higher professional skepticism. I
employ 1 x 3 between-participants design to test my hypotheses and use experienced
auditors as participants. I incorporate multiple measure of professional skepticism in my
tests. Table 6.1 contains a summary of each hypothesis and its results.
Hypothesis 1a predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a
deliberative mindset will display higher professional skepticism than will auditors
receiving documentation instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset.
Similarly, Hypothesis 1b predicts that auditors receiving the deliberative mindset
instructions will display higher professional skepticism than will auditors not required to
document evidence. I use five measures of professional skepticism to test these
hypotheses. The first two, the assessed risk that management’s estimate contains a
material misstatement and the likelihood that the auditor would recommend an
adjustment to the estimate, can be considered measures of skeptical judgment (Montague
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2010). The amount of time spent searching for and reviewing evidence, the total time
spent on the study, and the number of searches for audit evidence are measures of
skeptical action (Hurtt et al. 2013).
I find significant support for both Hypothesis 1a and 1b usingall five of my
measures of professional skepticism.. Auditors receiving the instructions designed to
invoke a deliberative mindset assessed a higher risk that the estimate is materially
misstated than did auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke an implemental
mindset and auditors not required to document evidence. Auditors in the deliberative
mindset condition also responded that they would be more likely to recommend an
adjustment of the estimate.
Further, auditors in the deliberative mindset condition spent more time searching
for and reviewing audit evidence, spent more time on the study, and conducted more
searches for evidence than did auditors in the implemental mindset condition. I find
some support for Hypothesis 1b in that auditors in the deliberative mindset, when
compared with auditors in the no documentation condition, spent significantly more time
searching for and reviewing audit evidence and spent more time on the study. 24
However, these two groups did not differ on the number of times they searched for more
audit evidence.
A possible reason why I did not find support for Hypothesis 1b using the number
of searches variable is that participants in the deliberative mindset condition found the
task to be significantly more difficult than participants in the other two conditions.
24

As discussed earlier, the differences in these variables could be attributable to differences in the
experimental conditions, particularly for the time spent searching for and reviewing audit evidence
variable.
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Participants in the no documentation group could have searched for more evidence
because they neither felt this difficulty taxation nor did they have to document the
evidence they found. Thus, it would have been less costly in terms of cognitive load for
participants in the no documentation condition to continue searching.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that auditors receiving documentation instructions designed
to invoke an implemental mindset will display lower professional skepticism than will
auditors not required to document evidence. I find mixed support for this hypothesis.
Participants between these two conditions did not significantly differ in their assessments
of the risk of misstatement or their assessed likelihoods of recommending an adjustment.
Thus, I find no support using the measures of skeptical judgment.
I find no statistical difference between the total time spent on the study between
participants in the implemental mindset group and participants in the no documentation
group. Participants in the no documentation group spent significantly less time searching
for and reviewing audit evidence, but this contrary result can be explained by the fact that
these participants did not have to document the evidence. Therefore, they could have
spent less time on this phase of the task due to differences in the requirements rather than
because they displayed lower professional skepticism.
I find that participants in the implemental mindset condition conducted
significantly fewer searches for evidence than did participants in the no documentation
condition. This finding strengthens the inference that the implemental mindset is
associated with lower professional skepticism and provides support for Hypothesis 2.
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Auditors in an implemental mindset could be more susceptible to biases such as the
preference to side with the client.
Hypothesis 3a predicts that auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke a
deliberative mindset will be more likely to enter broad, abstract documentation responses
than will auditors receiving instructions designed to invoke an implemental mindset. In
turn, Hypothesis 3b predicts that auditors in the implemental mindset group will be more
likely to enter detailed, specific documentation responses than will their counterparts in
the deliberative mindset group. I find strong support for this set of hypotheses.
6.2 Contributions
This study offers a number of important contributions to research, practice, and
regulation. First, I contribute to auditing and psychology theory by demonstrating the
relation between psychological distance, mindsets, and professional skepticism. In
particular, I show that the deliberative mindset, previously related to increased
psychological distance, is positively related to higher professional skepticism. In
contrast, I document a negative relation between the implemental mindset (decreased
psychological distance) and lower professional skepticism.
I provide information important to academics, practitioners, and regulators
interested in creating a judgment framework to assist with the audits of complex
estimates (as described in SEC 2008 and Bratten et al (2013)). My results suggest that
having an auditor consider the “why” of a situation rather than the “how” of a situation
can boost professional skepticism. Such a simple intervention can easily be incorporated
into any judgment framework.
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Additionally relevant to the judgment framework and consistent with prior
psychology research, I demonstrate a relation between mindsets and the type of responses
used to document or describe the situation. Establishing this link helps solidify the
relation between mindsets, psychological distance and professional skepticism described
throughout the paper. Specifically, broad, abstract responses are associated with
increased psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2003; 2010; Fujita et al. 2007),
and I demonstrate that auditors in a deliberative mindset are more likely to respond with
broad, abstract responses. Combined with the strong support for Hypothesis 1 indicated
earlier, I provide evidence that auditors in a deliberative mindset have increased
psychological distance from the evidence they evaluate which could be driving the
increase in professional skepticism.
I answer the call for research by Hurtt (2010) by exploring the concept of state
professional skepticism. By controlling for an auditor’s trait professional skepticism, I
show that the differences in professional skepticism displayed by auditors between my
experimental conditions are due to changes in state professional skepticism. Thus, I am
able to link the concept of state professional skepticism with the deliberative mindset and
show that task-specific instructions can be effective in increasing state skepticism.
I further contribute to theory and practice by demonstrating the possibility of a
negative relation between task complexity and professional skepticism. One possible
reason why there is not a significantly different number of searches between deliberative
mindset auditors and my no documentation group auditors is that the increase in
perceived task difficulty suggested by the deliberative mindset auditors could have
caused them to end their searches early. The increased cognitive load introduced by
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considering the evidence with a deliberative mindset could have been too taxing on the
auditors. The ending of the search process for this reason would be inherently unrelated
to professional skepticism but would be viewed ex post as a display of lower professional
skepticism (particularly by regulators). Future research, as described below, can be used
to test this conjecture.
6.3 Limitations
Every experimental study is subject to limitations and the current study is no
exception. First, I lost some experimental control by allowing a few groups of
participants the ability to complete the experiment on their own time. As noted earlier,
there is a difference, albeit an explainable one, in certain demographic variables between
participants that completed the study on their own and participants that completed the
study in a controlled setting. Although I would prefer to have all of the participants
complete the study in a controlled setting, I find that testing location did not interfere
with the results. The results of the study remain unchanged when including testing
location as a covariate.
Second, I believe improvements can be made in the measurement of construal
levels. As noted in Section 5.3, participants in the deliberative mindset condition
demonstrated high construal level scores (𝑥̅ = 6.11 out of a maximum of 8.00) while
participants in the implemental mindset condition demonstrated lower scores (𝑥̅ = -2.42
out of a minimum -8.00). A possible reason why participants in the implemental mindset
condition did not score lower is that the low-level construals used in the exercise
developed by Fujita et al. (2006) were too specific. For example, one situation asked
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participants about the idea of “making an expensive purchase.” The wording for the lowlevel construal description of this situation, “swiping a credit card,” could have been too
specific and caused participants to move to the high-level construal option even though
they might have been thinking with low-level construals in mind. Creating a better
measure of construal level will help provide support for the theoretical diagram displayed
in Figure 2 which predicts the relative time participants will spend in each mindset.
Third, participants in the no documentation condition did not have the
requirement to document evidence. This difference in the experimental design makes
comparisons between the no documentation group and the experimental groups more
difficult, particularly in terms of time spent on the study. I also potentially lost valuable
textual comments that could have been entered had I provided textboxes to participants in
the no documentation condition with minimal instructions to preserve control.
Finally, the deliberative mindset intervention increased two variables important in
an audit setting: time spent on the task and perceived difficulty of the task. An increase
in time could be considered inefficient. I argue that there should not be inefficiency
issues in the current study because I designed the evidence to suggest that the client’s
estimate is on the upper end of a reasonable range of values. However, the current study
cannot speak to whether there would be an increase in time in an audit situation not
calling for increased professional skepticism.
The increase in perceived task difficulty could suggest that the deliberative
mindset manipulation increased the cognitive load on participants in that condition. How
much the increased in perceived difficulty impacted the study is unclear. The
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understanding of this issue is particularly important considering the difficulty already
inherent in auditing complex estimates (Christensen et al. 2012; Bratten et al. 2013).
Future research can help tease out whether task difficulty affects professional skepticism.
6.4 Future Research
Potential limitations of a study often lend themselves to excellent future research
opportunities. As suggested in the previous section, one future course of study is to test
the relation between task difficulty and professional skepticism. More difficult tasks may
induce higher skeptical action due to the increase in focus required by the higher
difficulty. On the other hand, as suggested by the results in this study, higher complexity
could cause an auditor to prematurely conclude a task, such as searching for audit
evidence, simply because the task is cognitively draining. Such an end to the task could
be later interpreted to mean that the auditor failed to display an appropriate amount of
professional skepticism.
I also see promise in testing whether the increase in professional skepticism
induced by the deliberative mindset intervention causes a similar increase in professional
skepticism in a situation not calling for higher professional skepticism. For example,
future research could test for increases in skeptical judgments and actions in a situation
where the client’s estimate is fairly presented. The deliberative mindset intervention
could be deemed inefficient if there are increases and the increases are to the level of
those displayed in the current study.
This study shows that documentation instructions can be used to prolong the
deliberative mindset and increase professional skepticism. Are there other inexpensive
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interventions that auditors can employ that will result in similar increases in skepticism?
One possible option is a decision aid. A properly designed decision aid could be
effective in promoting professional skepticism; however, some types of decision aids can
have the opposite effect and can cause mechanistic behavior (Dowling and Leech 2007;
Whitecotton et al 1998). Future research would be useful in developing the proper design
of such a decision aid.
Further, my results provide evidence of a relation between construal level,
psychological distance, and professional skepticism. Auditors in the deliberative mindset
condition displayed higher professional skepticism and were more likely to enter broad,
abstract responses in their audit documentation. Future research could potentially use
this relation to develop an ex post measure of professional skepticism that would be
useful in demonstrating an auditor’s level of professional skepticism at given points in an
audit.
Finally, future research can attempt to identify mindset/construal levels via
methods other than those described in this study. For example, a study can be created
that uses verbal protocol analysis to help gauge a participant’s mindset level at each step
of the experimental task. This type of analysis could prove valuable in identifying the
specific times in which a person shifts mindsets and will help identify the changes in
judgments and actions that occur with the shift in mindset.
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Table 6.1. Hypotheses Summary and Results
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1a

Hypothesis 1b

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3a

Hypothesis 3b

Summary
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will display
higher professional skepticism than will auditors
in an implemental mindset.
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will display
higher professional skepticism than will auditors
not required to document evidence.
Auditors in an implemental mindset will display
lower professional skepticism than auditors not
required to document evidence.
Auditors in a deliberative mindset will be more
likely to enter broad, abstract responses than will
auditors in an implemental mindset.
Auditors in an implemental mindset will be more
likely to enter specific, detailed responses than
will auditors in a deliberative mindset.
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Result
Supported

Mixed Support

Mixed Support

Supported

Supported
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